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THE CONCEPT OF TAO IN CHINESE CULTURE*

CHUNG-YUAN CHANG

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IN THE CHINESE LANGUAGE the word *Tao* is rich in meaning and applicable to a wide range of both individual and social concepts. The symbol was adopted by various schools of philosophy and religion to represent their central idea. Thus we find Laotzu saying, "The Great *Tao* flows everywhere. . . . Myriad things derive their life from it"[1] and, "Before the Heaven and Earth existed, there was something nebulous: silent, isolated, standing alone, changing not, eternally revolving without fail, worthy to be the Mother of all things. I do not know its name and address it as *Tao*."[2] In Confucius we read: "It is man makes truth *(Tao)* great, and not truth *(Tao)* that makes man great."[3] In a dialogue with his disciples Confucius declared: "There is a central principle *(Tao)* that runs through all my teaching."[4] One of his disciples, a participant in a dialogue, explains, uncontradicted, that this *Tao* is simply the principle of reciprocity, or, as we would say in Western ethical thinking, the Golden Rule. The *Tao* of the Buddhist is the Way of Enlightenment leading to Nirvana. The Chinese Ch'an (or Zen) Masters feel, however, that *Tao* does not end with the Enlightenment of Nirvana, but that the wise man, the sage, still has the tasks of daily life to perform as an essential part of his experience of *Tao*. There is among the Ch'anists the saying: "To carrying water and chopping wood—therein lies the wonderful Tao."[5] Through two thousand and some hundred years this symbol, *Tao,* has been the central concept of Chinese thinking and worship.

* The research and preparation of this paper was made possible through the generosity of the Wenner-Gren Foundation.

1. Lin Yutang, *The Wisdom of Laotzu* (New York, 1948), p. 186. As a precautionary measure to avoid any slant in his choice of words toward the point of view he is expounding, the author of this paper has used translations of the Chinese texts by other scholars as much as possible. This will also enable the reader to refer to convenient translations for the entire text.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
3. *Idem, The Wisdom of Confucius* (New York, 1938), p. 184.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 186.
5. *Ch'uan Teng Lu* (Record of the Translation of the Light), chüan 8.

When the Gospel according to St. John was translated into Chinese, the Christians in China took advantage of the powerful connotations of the word *Tao,* and the first sentence of the Gospel runs: "In the beginning was the *Tao,* and the *Tao* was with God, and the *Tao* was God."

The period from the fifth through the third century B.C. is sometimes called the "Period of the Hundred Schools," because there were so many different "schools" of philosophical thinking, but Chinese historians have grouped these varying trends into six, sometimes ten, main streams of thought. All were devoted to the exposition of *Tao.* In the last chapter of the *Book of Chuangtzu,* the chapter entitled, "The World," we find a very valuable outline of the main schools of thought current in Chuangtzu's time (*ca.* 369—*ca.* 286 B.C.). The leading philosophers were Mo Ti, Sung Hsing, Hui Shih, Lao Tan, Chuang Chou, and others, all of whom were concerned with the development and exposition of the idea of *Tao.*

As to the place of the word *Tao* in the general culture and life of the Chinese people, we find it ranks twentieth in frequency among the 4,261 words listed by Chen in his word list.[6] It occurs very often in popular novels, newspapers, magazines, school textbooks, and supplementary readers. In Mathews' Chinese-English dictionary,[7] we find the word *Tao* as one of the eight most important characters among the 7,785 listed, with more than two hundred examples needed to elucidate the variety of its usage. The illustrations in Mathews are from the widest range of media—the classics, general literature, magazine, newspapers, advertisements, legal documents and other sources.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TERM TAO

It is evident that the character *Tao* plays an important role in the culture of the Chinese. Why is it that this character has been so widely adopted by the various schools of philosophy and religion and become so essentially involved in the culture and life of the Chinese people? *Tao* has been translated and interpreted variously by different Chinese and Western scholars. Ku Hung-ming translates *Tao* as "Moral Law,"[8]

6. H. C. Chen, *Yü T'i Wen Ying Yung Tzu Hui* (Word List of Vernacular Writing). (Shanghai, 1933).

7. R. H. Mathews, *A Chinese-English Dictionary* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944).

8. Lin, *Wisdom of Confucius,* p. 102.

Archdeacon Hardwick as "Nature,"[9] Paul Carus as "Reason,"[10] Legge[11] and Waley[12] call it simply "the Way." As Waley says, *"Tao* means literally a road, a path, a way. Hence, the way in which anything is done . . ." (p. 30). In *Shuo Wen,* the famous dictionary of Chinese, compiled about A.D. 100, *Tao* is defined as "The road on which you walk." But in much earlier Chinese literature, such as *The Book of Tao* (traditionally ascribed to Laotzu, *ca.* 571 B.C., but probably compiled by disciples and written in the third or fourth century B.C.), the very first sentence reads, in Chinese, *"Tao k'o tao, fei ch'ang Tao";* in English, "The *Tao* that can be told of is not the eternal *Tao.*" The word appears three times in this Chinese phrase, we notice. The first and last usage of the word is in the sense of "Way," as Waley has translated it, but the second appearance of the word is in the sense of "tell."

In the *Shu Ching,* the *Book of History,* written before the time of Confucius,[13] we find, "Pride brings loss and humility receives increase: —this is the way *(tao)* of Heaven."[14] Here "way" is a legitimate interpretation. But then we find, "But in the case of great crimes . . . if the offenders confess *(tao)* unreservedly their guilt, you may not put them to death."[15] Here we have *tao* used in the sense of "confess" or "tell." And in such a case as, "The nine branches of the Ho [river] were conducted *(tao)* by their proper channels,"[16] or, as in *Confucian Analects,* "If the people be led *(tao)* by laws . . ., they will try to avoid *the punishment,* but have no sense of shame. If they be led *(tao)* by virtue . . ., they will have the sense of shame and moreover will become good,"[17] we have *tao* used in the sense of "to guide" or "to lead." In short, we find the character *tao* used in the earliest Chinese writings as meaning "to tell," "to guide," or, as a noun, "the road." These three meanings still occur in the spoken language of the present day.

We find numerous examples of the use of the word today in all the above senses. Thus the phrase *nan tao,* means "You don't mean to say!" In this same sense of "say" or "tell" we find the expressions, *tao hsi, tao*

9. F. Max Müller, *Sacred Books of the East,* XXXIX, 13.
10. Paul Carus, *The Canon of Reason and Virtue* (Chicago, 1927).
11. James Legge, *The Four Books* (South Pasadena, Calif., 194-?).
12. Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (London, 1945).
13. H. G. Creel, *Confucius: The Man and the Myth* (New York, 1949), pp. 295 f.
14. Legge, *The Chinese Classics* (London, 1861-72), III, II, 65.
15. *Ibid.,* III, II, 388.
16. *Ibid.,* III, I, 99.
17. *Idem, Four Books,* p. 13.

ho, meaning "to congratulate," and the combination *tao hsieh* meaning "to thank." In the sense of "lead" we find *tao yin* or *yin tao,* which mean "to lead the way." And of course the word used in the simple sense of "way" is most common: *hai tao,* sea route; *t'ieh tao,* railway; *ho tao,* river way; *t'ien tao,* heavenly way; *jen tao,* man's way; *chung tao,* the middle path; and *ta tao,* the right path.

How can we explain the use of the word *tao* in this variety of senses? We do not find any explanation in the early dictionary to which we have referred above, where the word means simply "The road on which you walk." In an attempt to get the origins of the idea, the writer has examined the earliest occurrences of the character in Chinese writings —in ancient bronze inscriptions. Thus far the character has not been discovered among the still earlier oracular bone inscriptions. In a bronze inscription we find some hints on the ideographic content of the early character.

In collections of bronze inscriptions such as those of Liu[18] and Kuo,[19] we find the character *tao* variously depicted on a *p'an* (big vase) of the San family of Chou. The symbol is composed ordinarily of three elements: (1) indicating road; (2) indicating head; and (3) indicating foot. Occasionally we find the element indicating road or that indicating foot omitted. The presence in the ideograph of the two elements, head and foot, is significant. They do not, I believe, indicate "man," as we might ordinarily suppose; there is a much simpler and more common symbol for man. Rather, in this early representation of the word *tao,* the head with the stylized hairdress suggests an individual of some special importance, and the foot, a separate component, suggests a follower; we have, in short, a leader and a follower, with a clear indication of the meaning, "to lead," or "to guide."

We find a number of similar combinations in early oracular and bronze writings, for example: on oracle bones,[20] and on bronze.[21] Each of these ideographs is made up of two elements. The upper element in each case represent respectively, pig, deer, hare, dog, or some other

18. Liu Hsin-yüan, *Ch'i Ku Shih Chi Chin Wên Shu* (Description of the Bronze Inscription). (1902) VIII, 21 f.

19. M. J. Kuo, *Liang Chou Chin Wen Tz'u Hsi T'u Lu* (Plates of Systems of the Bronze Writing in Two Chou Dynasties). (Tokyo, 1937), p. 127.

20. Chu Fan-pu, *Chia-Ku Hsüeh* (The Study of Oracle Bones and Shells), (Shanghai, 1933), II, 9.

21. Jung Keng, *Chin Wen Pien* (Collections of Bronze Inscriptions), (Shanghai, 1938), II, 22, 1938.

animal. The lower element in each of the combinations is a foot, representing man, as in the ideograph for *"tao."* One of these combinations has persisted in use to the present day in the sense of "chase," showing a comparable implication of "following." In the *tao* ideograph, instead of man following an animal, one man follows another, presumably a leader. This suggests the notion of "finding a way out," or of resolving confusion. Perhaps we may further infer that the ideograph represents two psychological elements that make the symbol a source of satisfaction and security to the Chinese: the representation of a knowing and confident guide, and the assurance that there is a path along which man can be led that will bring him to safety and security. In any event, this early ideograph does not represent merely a simple "road" or "way." It may be said rather to have represented to the Chinese a concrete conditioning symbol which connotes a way of solving the problems of mental and spiritual life.

To turn to the etymology of the character *tao,* we find that another meaning of *tao,* "to tell," could have grown naturally out of the idea of leading the way. The leader explained the path man must follow in order to find his way out, and from this suggestion of a leader telling or explaining we derive the use of the character simply to mean "tell." In the most traditional novels, such as *Shui Hu Chuan,*[22] *San Kuo,*[23] *Hsi Yu Chi,*[24] and *Hung Lou Meng,*[25] *tao* is used in the even more elemental sense of "to speak": *shuo tao,* "to tell"; *hsiao tao,* "to say smilingly"; *ma tao,* "to swear angrily." From the meaning of "leading the way" we have a natural development into the meaning of "telling," and eventually into the simple sense of "way." The original meaning of the character, nevertheless, is that of guiding or leading the way out. The idea is one of great psychological importance.

In the realm of values, man's conditioning stimuli are, for the most part, symbols. After canalization is established, the symbol is used to strengthen the inward drive, and the symbol itself may become a source of satisfaction. Thus, from an examination of man's symbol-patterns, we may derive his value-patterns.[26] This process of value-establishment

22. Translated by Pearl Buck, *All Men Are Brothers* (New York, 1933).

23. Translated by Charles Brewitt-Taylor, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (Shanghai, 1925).

24. Translated by Arthur Waley, *Monkey* (London, 1942).

25. Translated by Chi-Chen Wang, *Dream of the Red Chamber* (New York, 1929).

26. See Gardner Murphy, *Personality* (New York, 1947), p. 270.

in man is clearly illustrated by the Chinese use of the symbol *tao*. In fact, *tao* is the fundamental value-symbol of the Chinese, and has become a great factor in the process of canalization and conditioning of man's innate impulses. From a simple representation of an actual man guiding another out of an actual situation, *tao* transcended any such material suggestion and came, in its largest sense, to represent life's ideal course.

CONFUCIUS' CENTRAL CONCEPT OF TAO

In pre-Confucian China the word *Tao* had already become implicitly and explicitly a symbol of the ideals of man. In the *Shu Ching* we find, "Heaven is not to be trusted. Our course [*Tao*] is simply to seek the prolongation of the virtue of the Tranquilizing king, . . ."[27] i.e., trust in the virtue of the great leader. Because the word had intrinsic power in the culture the various schools of philosophy, such as those identified with Laotzu, Confucius, Motzu, Yangtzu, and others, all took advantage of the potency of the word and seized upon it to use in their respective systems. In the chapter, "The World," in the *Book of Chuangtzu,* the author remarks, "There are many teachers of the philosophy of order and government in the world today. Each school regards itself as having found the best answers. It may be asked: In what school is to be found the philosophy *(tao shu)* of the ancients? The answer is that it is to be found in every system."[28]

On the other hand, as Hsuntzu (*ca.* 298–*ca.* 238 B.C.) points out, none of these schools taught what might truly be considered the complete *Tao*. As he says:

> In the ancient times traveling scholars were prejudiced—these were the erring schools of philosophy. Motzu was prejudiced towards utility and did not know the elegancies of life. . . . Shentzu was prejudiced towards law, and did not know the worthiness of man. . . . Huitzu was prejudiced towards words and did not know reality. Chuangtzu was prejudiced towards Nature, and did not know man. If we consider *Tao* from the standpoint of utility, it will merely be seeking profit. . . . If we consider *Tao* from the standpoint of law, it will merely be a technique. . . . If we consider *Tao* from the standpoint of words, it will merely be dialectic. If we consider *Tao* from the standpoint of Nature, it will merely be cause and effect. These different presentations are all one particular aspect of *Tao*.[29]

27. Legge, *Chinese Classics,* III, II, 477.
28. Lin, *Wisdom of Laotzu,* p. 24.
29. H. H. Dubs, *The Works of Hsüntze* (London, 1928), p. 265.

A modern German philosopher, Eduard Spranger, whose work has been examined by Woodworth[30] and Murphy,[31] has made an interesting classification of various types of men according to the nature of their basic method of evaluation in life. In using this well-known classification, we must, of course, beware of the danger inherent in systems of typology. Spranger sees men's evaluative systems falling into six categories: practical, theoretic, religious, aesthetic, social, and political. According to this classification, we might say that, in his exposition of *Tao,* Motzu inclined toward the practical, Shentzu toward the political, Huitzu toward the theoretic, Chuangtzu toward the aesthetic.

Of Confucius himself, however, Hsuntzu declared: "Confucius possessed the qualities of human-heartedness *(jen)* and wisdom *(chih),* and was not prejudiced. . . . He possessed the whole of *Tao.*"[32] It is undoubtedly true that Confucius' personality and teaching represented a more balanced system of evaluation than those of the other thinkers mentioned above. Elements of Spranger's six evaluative types can be found in Confucius' work. We are all aware that he devoted his life to search for knowledge and truth. In so doing he embodied the theoretic attitude, but he sought knowledge to put it to practical use. Queried by his students as to his attitude toward the people, he replied that the ruler's first duty was to enrich them (the economic or practical attitude) and then to teach them. Confucius always used the aesthetic ideal to inspire man to elegance of behavior. He strongly urged the study of music, and so much enjoyed *Shao* (ancient music) that, when he heard it, it destroyed in him for months the desire for more substantial food (the aesthetic attitude). One of the chief themes of Confucius' teaching is the love of mankind (the social attitude), and he was unselfish and sympathetic in expressing this attitude in his everyday life. He may also be said to have been politically minded. He made every effort to use his capacity and will to inculcate his own value direction in his followers and in the rulers of his time. His moral and political influence was not only powerful in his own time, but has persisted as an influence in China to the present day (the political, or power attitude). Spranger describes the religious type as one "whose whole mental structure is permanently directed to the creation of the highest and absolutely satisfy-

30. R. S. Woodworth, *Contemporary Schools of Psychology* (New York, 1948), p. 250.
31. Murphy, *op. cit.,* p. 283.
32. Dubs, *op. cit.,* p. 265.

ing value experience."[33] Confucius' faith succeeded in knitting together a whole nation in a set of unquestioned beliefs (the religious attitude). Thus, if we can follow Spranger's analysis, and agree that his types cover fairly thoroughly the realm of human experience, we may well agree with Hsuntzu that Confucius "possessed the whole of *Tao*."

After a long and thorough study of the Confucian classics, however, we come to realize that Confucius, although he covers the whole of experience, evaluates chiefly from two points of view: the social or sympathetic, and the theoretical or knowledge-seeking—in his own words, *jen* and *chih*. These two virtues are basic qualities of the perfect personality, the sage. Thus the meaning of *Tao* according to Confucius himself was mainly social and theoretical. Of *Tao*, Confucius said: "There is a central principle *(Tao)* that runs through all my teaching." His disciple's explanation was: "Our Master's *Tao* is simply this: *chung* and *shu*." *Chung* is the positive aspect of the practice of *jen*, that is, consideration of others. Confucius put it, "Desiring to sustain one's self, one sustains others." *Shu* is the negative aspect. In his words, "Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself." And so he says, "When the man of high station is well instructed *(tao)*, he loves man."[34] "When one cultivates to the utmost the principles of his nature, and exercises them on the principle of reciprocity (*chung* and *shu*), he is not far from the path *(Tao)*."[35] The ethos and eidos of the man who lives according to *Tao* were described by him as ". . . in his conduct of himself, he was humble; in serving his superior, he was respectful; in nourishing the people, he was kind; in ordering the people, he was just."[36] This is evaluation from the social aspect, one of Confucius' two basic methods.

The theoretically evaluative man, according to Spranger, is the man whose supreme interest is seeking knowledge and truth in every aspect of his life. He despairs over ignorance, and might well rejoice over a purely theoretic discovery, even if it should be an insight that would mean his death. We find this type clearly suggested in a saying of Confucius: "In the morning, hear the way *(Tao)*; in the evening, die content!"[37] On another occasion he described himself as "simply a man who in his eager pursuit of knowledge forgets his food, who in the joy *of its*

33. Eduard Spranger, *Types of Men* (Halle, 1928), p. 213.
34. Legge, *Four Books*, p. 256.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 365.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
37. Waley, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

attainment forgets his sorrows, and who does not perceive that old age is coming on."[38]

The *Tao* of Confucius, in both its social and theoretical aspects, is deeply reflected in the culture of the Chinese people. The theoretical mind, as we have described it, is directed toward the search for truth, toward the accumulation of knowledge, although it may be to one's personal disadvantage. The social mind may be described as the "value-affirming interest in another being and the taking-the-place-of-another."[39] Man does not live immediately through himself but through others. "In perfect love the limits of individuation disappear. Selfhood and self-sacrifice coincide."[40] We can observe this Confucian-inspired tendency on the part of the Chinese people by an inspection of the typical usages of the word *Tao* as it appears most frequently in the social milieu. The word *Tao* occurs in two very popular phrases, *tao li,* and *tao yi,* which illustrate the theoretic-mindedness and social-mindedness of the people. *Tao li* may be translated as reason, or principle; *tao yi* as duty toward others, or obligation.

One of the most characteristic features of Chinese communal life is the tendency of the people to gather in groups to discuss the moral and social aspects of any problem which may arise among them to determine the "principles" of the situation. In this social custom the tea house plays an important role. As Yang describes it, ". . . the market town tea house is a place where many community disputes and neighborhood quarrels are settled by drinking the so-called 'mediating tea.' "[41] It is the common ground upon which the parties involved meet to analyze the problem confronting them. The local leader may invite his friends to the tea house to settle their problems which they cannot solve by conventional rules and customs. The families of a husband and wife involved in a disagreement meet over tea to discuss a settlement of their difficulties and determination of the principles to be followed, or *tao li.* A Chinese woman who persuaded her husband to leave his aged parents for her convenience, an action unforgivable under Chinese ethics, would be severely criticized by her neighbors as *mo yu tao li,* a person of no principle, or *pu tung tao li,* one who does not

38. Legge, *Chinese Classics,* I, 65.
39. Spranger, *op. cit.,* p. 172.
40. *Ibid.,* p. 173.
41. Martin C. Yang, *A Chinese Village* (New York, 1945), p. 196.

understand the principles of things. Such a woman would undoubtedly be advised by her own parents, should she appeal to them, *hsiang hsiang tao li,* or "reflect upon this in the light of principles derived from facts." The welfare of the whole family is at stake. Such a woman does not understand the "grand principle" or *ta tao li,* upon which family happiness is based.

We find another example in Hu's article, "The Chinese Concept of Face."[42] We have here the story of a peasant who had promised to rent a donkey to an American woman traveling in the district. He declined to produce the donkey on the day bargained for and declared that she must wait until the following day. Moreover, he refused to permit her to make a bargain with another peasant. The altercation drew a crowd. When the owner of the donkey realized that the older people of the village were shaking their heads in disapproval, he finally turned and left the place without any further argument and the woman was free to hire another beast. He had "lost face" in his community. What this consisted of in this case was the condemnation by his neighbors of *mo yu tao li,* or *pu tung tao li,* a man without principle, or understanding of the reason involved in the situation.

We can distinguish this notion of *tao li* as representing the tendency of the Chinese to accept the function of reason in a situation, from *tao yi,* a related term, meaning the application of the principles of reason in the social situation. These obligations are dictated by love and sympathy. After the understanding of principles, comes their application in social duties and obligations. These social obligations, as dictated by love or sympathy, are referred to in Chinese as *tao yi.* Let us consider the moral ramifications of *tao yi* in an example. A young man of the town finds himself in a most embarrassing situation when he is invited to tea by his former teacher, a local scholar of repute and standing. On the surface this is merely a cordial invitation extended to the young man on the occasion of his return home after a long sojourn in distant parts. But the young man, it seems, during his absence from his native town, had remarried, despite the fact that he already had a devoted and loyal wife at home, who unstintingly gave herself to the care of his children and his parents. This situation does not present the same moral and legal complications that it would in the Western world, but it clearly is

42. Hsien Chin Hu, "The Chinese Concept of Face," *American Anthropologist,* XLVI (1944), 45.

a violation of the spirit of *tao yi,* and the young man knows that the invitation to tea by his teacher is a summons to account for his behavior in the customary tea house ceremony. Were the invitation truly one simply to welcome him, it would be rather an invitation to dine at the home of the teacher. The young man is reminded thereby that his first wife, who devoted herself to him in his struggling days, does not deserve the betrayal of which he has been guilty. He has wandered not only from basic principles, *tao li,* but he has violated *tao yi,* his moral and sentimental obligations.

These moral and sentimental obligations as applied to friendship are called *tao yi chih chiao.* We have an example in the case of the young man who went off to defend his country against the Japanese invasion, leaving his aged mother and his young brother in the care of his friend. When the soldier gave up his life at the front, his friend felt even more deeply the moral and sentimental obligations of *tao yi* to continue to support the elderly mother and see the youngster through his formative years. Such a devoted and loyal friendship is *tao yi chih chiao.*

Tao yi covers something more than the area embraced by *tao li. Tao li* is the principle which one should understand. So we have the phrase *hsiang hsiang tao li,* or to consider principle. The phrase is an injunction when one is puzzled as to the "reason why." *Tao yi* is the further demand, not upon mere reason, but upon love and sympathy. A line in a well-known Chinese couplet goes, *ti chien tan tao yi,* which means literally, "The iron shoulder carries *tao yi,*" or, more intelligibly translated, something like, "To carry out the demands of love and sympathy I have a sturdy shoulder."

To consider these two terms in the light of Confucianism, we may say that *tao li* is parallel to the Confucian *chih,* knowledge or wisdom, and *tao yi* is the fulfillment of *jen,* human-heartedness or man-to-man-ness. As Confucius says, "Human-heartedness consists in loving others."[43] But merely understanding man does not take us beyond the realm of the theoretical attitude. Only if a breadth of sympathy and love is added, do we find ourselves in the social realm. *Jen* and *chih* are the central pillars of Confucian philosophy. These values, which we may express as *tao li* and *tao yi,* are the central concepts in the moral life of the Chinese people. They are pivotal ideas around which the Chinese makes moral

43. Translated by Fung Yu-Lan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy* (New York, 1948), p. 42.

evaluation, and even the common man attempts to use them as a guide to the conduct of his daily life.

LAOTZU'S CONCEPT OF TAO

Having surveyed this dual central concept of Confucianism, we must, to complete the picture, inspect the concept of *Tao* as it was presented by the Taoist philosophers, whose teachings were adopted by later Confucianists to construct the theory of Neo-Confucianism. This brief examination of Taoism will serve as an instructive contrast to the ideas of Confucianism, and to suggest more fully the range and meaning of *Tao*.

We have already quoted the dictum of Laotzu: "The *Tao* that can be told of is not the eternal *Tao*." It is evident that the *Tao* of Laotzu is something quite different from that outlined by Confucius. The word "Way," used as a translation for the *Tao* of both Confucianism and Taoism, is apt, obviously only because its meaning is vague. Kuo Hsiang (died *ca.* A.D. 312), one of the great commentators on the works of Chuangtzu, declares that *Tao* is really *Wu*, that is, "nothing" or "nothingness." As he puts it, "The *Tao* is everywhere, but everywhere it is nothing."[44] Fung attempts to clarify this: "*Tao* is *Wu*, but by *Wu* they meant having no name. . . . *Tao* is not a thing; hence it is unnameable."[45] "But since we wish to speak about it, we are forced to give it some kind of designation."[46] Such explanations are not, perhaps, very satisfactory. We may best reach some understanding by an examination of the original text. Here we find:

> The thing that is called *Tao*
> Is elusive, evasive
> Evasive, elusive,
> Yet latent in it are forms.
>
> Elusive, evasive,
> Yet latent in it are objects.
> Dark and dim,
> Yet latent in it is the life force.[47]

44. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 220 f.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
47. Lin, *The Wisdom of Laotzu*, p. 132.

These lines speak of three things: "form," a whole or organization; "object," the elements of parts of the organization; and an elusive, evasive "quality" that interrelates the parts and manifests itself as force. The solar system illustrates this concept. It is a form constituted by the harmonious interrelations among its parts. The interrelations not only create the form, but its quality produces a force. Modern psychologists, particularly the *Gestaltists,* have made analogous observations. They consider human behavior to be an organized whole. The personality is regarded as not merely a sum of traits, but a *Gestalt.* We find further reference to this concept in the *Tao Te Ching:*

> Thirty spokes unite around the nave;
> From their not-being (loss of their individuality)
> Arises the utility of the wheel.
>
> Mold clay into a vessel;
> From its not-being
> Arises the utility of the vessel.[48]

That is, each spoke or grain of clay is an individual part. It does not have the function of the whole; the function is that of the wheel or vessel. But when the parts are organized into a new form and demonstrate their "membership character," the function of the wheel or vessel emerges. Thus the new whole possesses a quality of form which did not inhere in any of its parts. Similarly, the isolated person does not manifest the quality found in organized society. In a harmonious society all individuals co-operate in the full expression of the society. If conflict disturbs the harmony, the unity disintegrates. Chuangtzu expresses this thought well: "Society is the agreement of a certain number of individuals and families to abide by certain customs. Discordant elements unite to form a harmonious whole. Take away this unity and each has a separate individuality."[49] In both physical and social organization, unity is the fundamental principle. A modern expression for this term is "integration." Laotzu called it "oneness." The possession of oneness is the act of bringing together the parts into an integral whole. It is the growth process of all things in the world. The achievement is generally

48. *Ibid.,* p. 87.

49. Herbert A. Giles, *Chuangt'zu: Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer* (Shanghai, 1926), p. 347.

called *Tao*. In a strict sense, according to the Taoists, it is *Te*, the fulfillment of *Tao*.[50]

This concept is also applicable to the explanation of the mental states of the individual. Laotzu frequently speaks of *yin* and *yang*, white and black, male and female, being and non-being, all of which seem similar to what C. G. Jung calls the pairs of opposites of human nature. According to this theory, the total individual psyche is composed of the conscious and the unconscious, the two opposites being complementary. Psychic energy is released and enhanced wholesomely by the unification of both. But people are aware of the conscious only; they neglect the unconscious, which is the foundation of our psychic life. All the capacities and potential interests which lie undeveloped and unemployed in the conscious life are latent tendencies in the unconscious. Therefore, we must tap the unconscious, we must bring out and develop its highest potentialities and integrate them into our conscious life.

In the *Tao Te Ching*, Laotzu similarly perceives the importance of unification of opposites. He states that all things carry *yin* and *yang*. Through the union of these two, harmony is reached. Applied to human nature, *yin* may be related to the unconscious and *yang* to the conscious. "The unification of the opposites in the middle way" is conceived as *Tao* by C. G. Jung.[51] In a strict sense, the Taoists call this unification *Te*, which is *Tao* in its manifestation.

To summarize, the concept of *Tao*, as it is elucidated by Taoist philosophers, is the force produced by harmonious interplay of the parts in an organization, physical, social, as well as mental. To describe the nature of this harmonious interplay, Taoists point to the unification of the physical world, to the very laws of nature itself. One observes the perfect unity, for example, of the solar system. Its parts function in relation to each other without distinction of greater or lesser. Chuangtzu says: "From the point of view of *Tao* . . . there are no such distinctions as high and low. From the point of view of individuals, each holds himself high and holds others low."[52] These human distinctions between me and non-me, between high and low, are antithetical, according to

50. The meaning of *Te* and its relation with *Tao* require a long and thorough explanation. This problem is discussed in the writer's unpublished paper on "The Concept of *Te* in Chinese Philosophy."

51. C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology*, p. 224.

52. Lin Yutang, *The Wisdom of China and India* (New York, 1942), p. 685.

the Taoists, to unification in an ideal organization. In nature "Being and non-being interdepend in growth; difficult and easy interdepend in completion . . . tones and voice interdepend in harmony."[53] "Which being the case, the true sage rejects all distinctions and takes his refuge in Heaven (Nature)."[54] As soon as distinctions are made, the secrecy of unity or Oneness is destroyed. That is the essential law of nature. Only by following this law of nature will man be able to "reveal his original simplicity" and "lessen his desires" toward others. Then he will be able to show his "gentleness and humility."

In reference to the psychic world, Jung points out that, through the method of non-differentiation, man's consciousness no longer is obsessed by compulsive motivation, but rather his thinking becomes visionary. When the contents of the unconscious are no longer projected, the center of man's personality shifts. It is no longer in the ego but in a position midway between the conscious and the unconscious. This new center may be called the real self.[55] A new personality is developed which will not be dislodged by disturbances of the emotions. In other words, man becomes well integrated. The attainment of this high level of integration is generally called *Tao,* but in a strict Taoist sense, it is the attainment of *Te* which is the manifestation of *Tao.* This process of non-differentiation between subject and object and the transcendence of mind over ideas of high and low are manifestations of what Spranger would call, respectively, the aesthetic and religious values.

Religious and aesthetic evaluation such as we find in Taoism, are not concepts completely alien to Confucianism. Despite Confucian emphasis on theoretical and social values, we find many religious and aesthetic implications inspired or borrowed from the Taoists. Of interest to us here is the Confucian description of non-differentiation such as we find expressed in the *Book of Chuangtzu.* Yen Hui, Confucius' best disciple, was touched by Taoist ideals, and we have the story of Confucius' questioning of Yen Hui, who had been practicing "sitting in forgetfulness." "I have become One with the Infinite," declared Yen Hui. "If you have become One," said Confucius, "there can be no room for bias. If you have lost yourself, there can be no more hindrance. . . .

53. *Idem, The Wisdom of Laotzu,* p. 47.
54. Lin, *Wisdom of China and India,* p. 636.
55. Richard Wilhelm and C. G. Jung, *The Secret of the Golden Flower* (London, 1945), p. 123.

I trust to be allowed to follow in your steps."[56] This story is one of doubtful authenticity, but there is no denying the fact that such an effort would be viewed sympathetically by some Confucianists. And, since the Sung dynasty, there has undeniably been Neo-Confucian emphasis upon the religious and aesthetic ideals more generally associated with Taoism. We have, for example, Chang Tsai (1020-77), who says: "The Great Harmony is known as the *Tao* [. . . the Supreme Ultimate]. Because in it there are interacting qualities of floating and sinking, rising and falling, movement and quiescence, therefore there appear in it the beginnings of the emanating forces which agitate one another, overcome or are overcome by one another, and contract or expand, one with regard to the other."[57] The scope of *Tao* in the Confucian school may be said to have been enlarged by the influence of Taoist philosophy. The effort, such as we have evidenced by the Neo-Confucianists, is that of a shift of gravity in the evaluative system of Confucianism. Without abandoning its older social and theoretical principles, Confucianism added a new emphasis on the aesthetic and religious evaluative concepts. From filial piety we expand to the notion of a universal piety which extends to the natural universe (as we see in the teaching of Chang Tsai). From the love of knowledge and understanding of principle we grow outward to the capacity for "emotionless" contemplation of a non-differentiated universe.

THE RELIGIOUS TAOIST'S AND BUDDHIST'S CONCEPT OF TAO

The concept of *Tao* as developed by the Taoist philosophers was expanded in the Taoist religion proper, and in Buddhism. Taoism as a religion,[58] in point of fact, is quite different from the philosophical system propounded by Laotzu, the traditional founder of Taoism. The original Taoists accepted death as they did life, as a natural phenomenon. The religious Taoists, on the other hand, became greatly enamored of the notion of immortality and the prolongation of natural life. Certain groups attempted through meditation and secret elixirs to dis-

56. Lin, *Wisdom of China and India*, p. 666.

57. Fung, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

58. The Taoist religion was founded on an esoteric interpretation of the teachings of the Yellow Emperor and Laotzu by Chang Tao-ling, traditionally the first head of the organization, in the first century A.D.

cover the way to spiritual, or even physical immortality. For these religious groups, *Tao* degenerated into a form of magic power which would guarantee them such an extension of natural life through the potency of incantations, or the use of mysterious potions. The phrase *tao ken* is often used in this connection; one says of such-and-such, as an immortal or mythical being, that he has one thousand years *tao ken,* i.e., that he has the strength of *Tao* to preserve him for one thousand years. Similarly, the magic power developed by such an immortal or near-immortal is called *tao li,* or the strength of *Tao.* The supernatural vision possessed by such a being and his capacity for prophecy is known as *tao yen,* or "the eye of the immortal." Even plants and animals partake of these religio-magic properties and achieve such extended life *(tao ken),* magical power *(tao li),* and supernormal vision *(tao yen).* The common people who follow the Taoist religion sometimes carry amulets and charms prepared by the Taoist priests to ward off evil. Children are given efficacious Taoist names, the people recite magic incantations, and the *Tao Te Ching* itself is credited with supernatural power and placed beside the ill to dispel evil spirits.

Early in the Christian era, Buddhism was reinterpreted in China in terms of Taoist philosophy. This practice, despite its seeming superficiality, resulted in a remarkable fusion of Indian Buddhism with Taoism, and led to the formation of a Chinese form of Buddhism. The state described by Chuangtzu as "sitting in forgetfulness," is related to the Buddhist *Nirvana.* The Enlightenment is often referred to by the *Ch'an* masters as the "vision of the *Tao.*" In such a sudden enlightenment one's problems are solved. Such an Enlightenment, which comes "like the bottom of a tub falling out," is, according to the *Ch'an* masters, "the indubitable *Tao.*" P'u-yuan (died A.D. 830), a well-known Buddhist, once said: "The *Tao* is not classifiable as either knowledge or non-knowledge . . . it is like a wide expanse of emptiness."[59] To the Buddhist, therefore, the search for *Tao* is the search for this elusive "wide expanse of emptiness." The travel-worn pilgrim, the ascetic beggar, the elderly women who count their endless prayer-beads, all seeking the *Nirvana* of endless emptiness, are working toward their conception of *Tao.*

To summarize our survey of the word *Tao* and its cultural and philosophical role in Chinese life: we have examined the extraordinary

59. *Ku Tsun Su Yu Lu* (Recorded Sayings of Ancient Worthies), chüan 13.

potency of the symbol *tao* in the culture of the Chinese people, beginning with the period before it had been seized upon by any of the great philosophical and religious systems as a convenient and powerful condensation of the psychologically meaningful content of those systems. Thereafter various philosophers took over the word and expanded or adopted it to their various values and purposes. The two great schools which have used *Tao* as a central concept are, of course, Confucianism and the school of Laotzu. Confucianism suggested that the Way, the *Tao,* was an ideal chiefly social and theoretical in its connotations. Confucius, therefore, exhorted the people to search for truth and to observation of social obligation. Taoism emphasized its aesthetic and religious aspects as a creative way of life and a harmonious sense of unity with the universe. That these ideas have interacted freely is one of the great cultural facts in the history of China. To put it most simply, the effect has been, in the case of Confucianism, to expand its original sphere and to embrace a variety of evaluative systems rather than to restrict itself to a single view of life.

A still more important fact in the history of Chinese culture is the degree to which the ideals of Confucianism have permeated the life of the ordinary man in China. We see the culture of the Chinese described as "this-worldly, prosily moralistic, and matter of fact."[60] The elevated nature of the Confucian philosophical system and its concept of *Tao* does not prevent it from being an active force in the thinking and behavior of the common man. This is because it is a system whose grasp of the natural and social "reality principle," to use a Freudian term, ties it up closely with the basic culture of the people in China. We have here an example of cultural integration between the advanced pattern and the behavior of the common man, which is well illustrated in the expansion and transformation of the concept of *Tao.* As Kroeber says:

> Values in this technical or philosophical sense might be informally defined as those things—cultural products, standards, or ideas—which men living in societies prize and hold as having a high importance. . . . Christianity is one of the great values of our society and culture. . . . In China, Confucianism would represent a similar value. No one would deny that these values influence human conduct and constitute real phenomena and effective forces in the world of history, and therefore of nature.[61]

60. A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology* (New York, 1948), p. 294.
61. *Ibid.,* p. 295.

THE VISIONS OF THOMAS S. JONES

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TWENTY YEARS AGO there died in New York an American writer and poet of unusual religious insights and extraordinary character, Thomas S. Jones. Five years thereafter the greater part of his verse, gathered from a dozen small volumes, appeared in a collected edition bearing the somewhat rococo title, *Shadow of the Perfect Rose*. In the year in which this article is written the manuscripts of his voluminous writings, prose and verse, have been permanently placed in the Library of Columbia University. The greater part of these were taken down through a psychologically fascinating practice of automatic writing. The work has considerable interest from at least three angles: aesthetic, psychological, and religious. Although Jones's religious thought affords the main theme of these pages, in any study of his religious experience neither his art nor his mind as seen from the psychologist's standpoint can be altogether overlooked.

We are all being continually dissected and analyzed by time. Virtually a generation has now passed since the greater part of Jones's work was produced. This reminds us of what vast changes have occurred in literature and religion, in taste and the spiritual life, in our orientation to history and to the living cultures of the globe. But valid insights into either religion or art, instead of growing stale with time, simply appear to us from new angles. Within a single generation a literary record usually passes through two pronounced stages: first, it becomes outmoded; second, it lives again in considerably altered aspect. Chiefly through the radical changes in the larger areas of thought, this familiar development occurs even more strikingly than usual here. A fitting moment for reappraisal arises. As dissected by time, the weaker elements seem weaker than ever, whereas the stronger on this very account emerge to greater prominence. One sees Jones more than ever behind the vanguard of his age in some respects, yet in advance of it in others. When the accounts are now added up, he makes a definite though, it must be confessed, hardly a great contribution to religious and literary culture.

Jones is one of the infinite host of men refuting the common error that the mystic is inexpressive. The mystic is not precise in his mean-

ings, but he may be highly expressive in artistic activity. Jones is a mystical artist. Within limited fields he is thoughtful and, one might add, philosophical. He combines gifts of seer and singer and is, in the ancient sense of the word, a bard. Few men have acquitted themselves so well in the difficult field which he selects as his own. Possibly this may not seem to us the most fertile or expansive field, but it indubitably hangs on the lofty and precarious slopes of religious vision.

His originality, as with almost any artist, lies not in opening up entirely new areas but in cultivating the old in a novel manner. His subject matter remains conspicuously old, yet not so his treatment of it. Serious religious thought he first came upon in the middle years of life, bringing to it exceptional aids from a variety of sources. Untrained in formal theology, he was an inspired amateur aided by a variety of felicitous circumstances: a more God-intoxicated man than are most priests. In other words, he came upon religion through his emotional and psychical experience, through suffering, joy, and art. During his most productive years quite widely read and informed, though no academic scholar, he brought his sensitive appreciation of romantic poetry, world literature, the arts, anthropology, and the latitudinarianism of the early years of this century to bear upon his life and writings.

For the record's sake, it should be noted that some of his prose writings were privately printed and are extremely difficult to procure. As would be expected, much material largely, though not wholly, of minor worth, remains in manuscript. Pages of small literary value often have exceptional psychological value. Tentative studies in this regard were at one time made by Professor Gardner Murphy. For these reasons, the extensive collection now left to Columbia University is no inconsiderable a mine.

Jones's biography should at least be sketched. He was a gifted and temperamental child, strongly attracted to his mother, who died when he was twelve, equally repelled by his father, who lived until he had become a young man. He had phenomenally keen physical senses and the most violent emotions. Part of his early training was in a military academy. At Cornell he came powerfully under the influence of Max Müller's close friend, Charles Mellen Tyler, with whom he studied Eastern religions, Hiram Corson, a spiritualist and English teacher, friend of Tennyson and Browning, and Edward Bradford Titchener, once a student of Walter Pater at Oxford. Their influences were ex-

tremely important, though bearing their chief fruit several years after Jones had left college.

For a short time he was theatre reviewer for *The New York Times.* That he was more devoted to theatrical art than to journalism might be inferred from a curious incident in his reportorial career. In a restaurant he witnessed the most celebrated murder of the day, the shooting of the architect, Stanford White, by Harry K. Thaw, but thought the matter beneath reporting to his paper. He was the sole reporter present. This other-worldly man soon retired from any pretense of business. Ill health and need for aloofness caused him to limit his personal contacts to a most rigidly controlled circle of friends, beyond which he admitted only the most casual acquaintances.

The road to his religious thought led through the somewhat decadent romanticism of the first few years of the present century. Vague, unintellectual thinking, wispy idealism, clichés of nature imagery, nostalgia, yearning, escapism, quietism, self-pity and, in general, a plush romanticism, make his earliest published verse seem notably derivative and outdated. He suffered from a moist April. Yet in the very slush of this romanticism sturdy roots began to grow. He was at least more skillful and discerning a writer than most of his associates.

Jones collaborated with Clinton Scollard, one of the most popular verse romanticists of the times. They composed small volumes together and edited a magazine introducing to America some of the work of Pater, Lionel Johnson, and Louise Imogen Guiney. Jones was surrounded by a group of lyrical ladies quite prominent at the moment, to whom might be added a few genteel men. The names include Jessie Rittenhouse, Edith Thomas, Anna Hempstead Branch, the more gifted Lizette Woodworth Reese, with Arthur Upson, and James Lane Allen. Then came a darker period for Jones's spirits. During the World War, 1914-1918, life closed in on him. Mentally and physically distressed, sincerely depressed by the violence of the world, living in a New York apartment, he was immured in a small rented hall bedroom decorated as a pre-Raphaelite shrine, from which he would emerge to visit the theatre, the church, his friends, and, at special intervals, the countryside which he so ardently loved. Then came a crisis in his career wherein by repeated exercise of the will he dedicated himself to religious experience. In a lyric, "In Excelsis," even more a vow and prayer than a poem, he declares that he will offer his life and art, with all their joys

and sorrows, to God's service. It was no easy vow, not so much because any violently hostile forces threatened it, but because the aesthete in this follower of Pater was, to begin with, considerably stronger than the devotee and remained in some prominence to the end of his life. Loath to choose a sect, he resigned himself to his own religious vision and not strictly to the churches, although he greatly valued the sacrament. Among his diverse friends were a loyal Catholic, a distinguished leader in social service, several academic scholars but, it must be confessed, relatively few priests. Jones came to his own insights by his own paths, among which were obviously to be included his love for poetry and the arts, for philosophical and religious authors, and for the disciplines of his own writing.

The word "disciplines" here carries an uncommonly paradoxical meaning, largely because of his peculiar habit of composition. With their blur of romantic imagery and their idealistic thought, his early poems bear every evidence of being deliberately cut to certain popular fashions of the day, although they are sincere as to their subject matter, and the banality of much of the language the author himself can hardly have recognized. His new style was to be in any case less sweet. It is in a sense learned poetry. Its verse form is almost invariably the sonnet. And despite Jones's premeditation of much of his work and considerable reliance upon a library, the actual writing was from 1921 done entirely by an "automatic" process. No part of these works was committed to writing until inscribed with great flowing script in pencil by the hand of a woman over whose wrist the poet held his fingers. There was no real question as to what hand directed the pencil. But Jones felt that all such writing was in some way instantaneously bestowed upon him, not composed in the usual manner, either through reason or intuition. A Muse intervened. Occasionally the Muse even used foreign tongues with which the poet denied acquaintance. The mind of the Muse was certainly not that of the medium, who was fitted for her modest role in part by her incontestable neutrality. The actual Muse was, in Jones's eye, more nearly an ever nameless spirit somewhere in the angelic hierarchies, but he really had no theory in the matter.

Memories of the death of his mother seem to have haunted him and to have had a crucial influence in this crisis of his life. His poems composed at this time, some by automatic and some by normal writing,

stress immortality, usually allegorized in terms of the seasons. We read much of autumn coloring and of spring flowers. In the ritual of Jones's religious year the two poles were All Saints' Day, or the last day of fall, and Easter, theoretically the first of spring. One takes Jones seriously as a religious thinker and poet only after he has sowed what might be termed his wild lilies. The demarcation is drastic. His specifically religious sonnets begin with his little volume, *Sonnets of the Cross* (1922), first published in England, and continue through eight similar publications spaced through the last decade of his life. It was at this crucial period, around 1921, that the present writer knew Jones best and was enabled to follow the changes in his thought, the advance and the retreat, almost from day to day. The stars in their courses had not made life easy for him, but their influence by occult means prepared the ground for the rapid growth of a writer of uncommon qualities.

Regarding his prose works little need be said. Perhaps they will some day be reissued in more available editions. The chief of them may be described as long short-stories with much symbolism and medieval settings, usually Celtic or Saxon. The manuscripts further contain many Blakian parlyings with persons of importance in religion and art. Jones's unconventional manner of writing enabled him to come into mysteriously intimate communication with the past. Browning's interest in mediums should not be forgotten nor the spiritual seances of Browning's friend and Jones's teacher, Hiram Corson.

Of the poetry it may be said, first of all, that it reveals a mind specially attuned to "nature mysticism,"—if such words are admissible. It also shows a mind on the one hand friendly to Christian pieties, on the other hand, insatiably restless, seeking for enlightenment among a considerable range of cultures and religions. Without the language of the schools yet with a warm personal expression, Jones records his belief in the oversoul, the divine being manifesting itself in countless religions and sages, and even showing its inscrutible paradoxes to men of pure thought and science.

It will at once be recognized that Jones's meditations grew in an unweeded soil. He is an aesthete in that, in his less felicitous passages, he admits a romantically decorated language, a language wherein the rituals of nature and the cults fail to emerge from literary and romantic clichés. But a considerable number of solidly built poems and passages largely escape these defects. They are the pointed epitomes of a sym-

bolic art. By and large, the less impressive poems have their origins in the lives of the saints; the more interesting and effective pieces, as a rule, deal with the sacred books or directly with sages, philosophers, and artists. The great majority are centered upon some historical or legendary person.

A ready glance at the scope of the writing may be had by mention of a few names upon which outstanding poems are written: Akhnaton, Gautama, Lao-Tse, Ezekiel, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Euripides, Marcus Aurelius, Clement of Alexandria, Saint Augustine, Hugo of Saint Victor, Pico Della Mirandola, Bruno, Fra Angelico, Leonardo, Cornelius Agrippa, John Donne, and Richard Crashaw. These poems are not prose commonplaces jostled into rhyme; they are fresh, vigorous, imaginative.

The story does not end here. Part of Jones's ancestry was Welsh. With a symbolism much wiser than he knew, his father had his son baptized in a ceremony conducted in the Welsh tongue. Jones's closest friend was of Irish descent, the most helpful of his scholar-friends, a distinguished leader in Celtic studies. Jones came much under the influence of the Celtic cultural revival. (One is reminded of many leading poets, from Gerard Manley Hopkins to Dylan Thomas.) Although virtually uninfluenced by Yeats, he was deeply affected by the Celtic bias of Lionel Johnson, Michael Fairless, Padraic Colum, George Russell, Douglas Hyde, and many of their associates. Behind the "Celtic Revival" itself stood, of course, the intuitions of Matthew Arnold in his celebrated essay on the Celtic Spirit, which Jones knew well. Thus the Grail legend as related by Malory supplied him with a starting point. In Irish medieval legend Jones found much deeply engrossing: some of his best pieces deal with such figures as the chief Welsh poet, the mysterious and bardic Taliesin, and the leading saints, Patrick, Columba, Bridget, Cuthbert, Kevin. The Welsh religious imagination, so fertile, so powerful in begetting and sustaining folklore, so potent in dream patterns and in mysticism, even led him at times to suspend his preference for treating religious leaders as the heroes and heroines of his verse and to writing at the same time both more personally and more impersonally. On these themes he wrote most clearly con amore. From *The Golden Bough* and similar encyclopedic sources he drew images and ideas that provided precious metal for his religiously inspired art.

Eclecticism in religion seems almost in itself to have attracted Jones.

Many of the books that he knew on the Celtic lands dealt with the period when Christianity was making its hard-fought entrance; and the question has even been seriously posed whether the Celtic areas of Great Britain and Ireland have in reality ever been more than partially Christianized. This remains a problem for students of Joyce to ponder. A continual throw-back along time's stream to some bright, pagan Eden seems implied in some of Jones's best poems. The further from today, the purer the current. Hence the Ireland of Columba is good, that of the Druids even better. Here is not impossibly a return to the earth, to the Mother Image. We are not surprised to find anthropology and folklore at least as good friends to Jones's verse as theology or the religious philosophers. Primitivism pursues the modern artist on every hand, whether he be author of "The Waste Land," composer of "The Rites of Spring," painter of "The Women of Avignon," or sculptor of pseudo-African statuary. Here is one of several respects in which Jones, his conservatism in language notwithstanding, appears as a modern. This addiction grew upon him from year to year. Jones, to return to the earlier theme, takes an almost secret but certainly an intense pleasure in seeing one faith succeed another. In turn come pagan Ireland, Christian Ireland, and the transcendental or mystical Ireland. First the Druids, then the saints, and then George Russell and his friends, with indestructible nature about them as a temple. In the accumulative sequence nothing is forgotten. Nor, so far as Jones's religious speculations are concerned, is Ireland in any way unique. It is simply a page upon which the runes of history stand out most clearly.

The eclectic spirit is similarly represented in pieces dealing with the conjunction of the classical and Christian in ancient times, the Platonic with the Christian Neo-Platonic. His moving sonnet on Clement of Alexandria affords an example. Or, to proceed to later periods of transition, his not dissimilar piece on Dons Scotus, who is viewed as giving a darkening age a reminder of the light of Greece, or the sonnet on Pico Della Mirandola, with its picture of that thinker's attempt to reconcile the Classical, the Arabian, and the Christian. Like Thomas Hardy, then, Jones delights to meditate on a Roman road, traversed by successive faiths. Also, his eye is on the convergence of the highways. But in some of his moods he does not rest in Christianity, and, although he celebrates several pantheists, a limit should be acknowledged, for

the more exacting features of the pantheist's doctrine seem at no time to have been envisaged.

Although to the last Jones occasionally stumbles upon the obvious, the pietistic, or even the banal in thought and word, as he matured the intricacies of character and idea increasingly enthrall him. The obscure harmonies of science and religion fascinate him. He relishes the dark mysteries of Leonardo's world, where science and idealism, matter and mind, the diabolic and the celestial, eagle and dove, join in tantalizing embrace. Similarly, the alchemical studies of Cornelius Agrippa and Albertus Magnus allure him. He is entranced by John Donne's dialectic of good and evil, and by Richard Crashaw's still more perilous baroque conjuncture of flesh and spirit. Although largely simple and direct in his art, clearly some paradoxes and subtleties of the spiritual life are by no means lost upon him. In charmingly lucid language he depicts the celebrated conflict between Confucius and Lao-Tse, where, needless to say, his sympathies rest with the latter. He is well aware of the tragedy and irony in the idealist's faith, thoughts strongly expressed in lines on Marcus Aurelius. He is willing to bide his time for peace, as his tribute to Saint Cuthbert, pacifist in wartime, well shows. Even a classical proportion appears in his equal devotion to the dialectics in ethics which he finds in Socrates and the pathos signalled out for attention in his tribute to Euripides.

A number of his finest sonnets are capsules of a potent mysticism, quiet but possibly even more powerful on this account. His most successful approach here is the accent upon inwardness, to use the weaker English word, or better, the German *Innerlichkeit*. His highly colored poem, "The Unicorn," conveys this thought of aloneness, as do his "House of the Soul," in substance an epitome of the Middle English poem, "Pearl," or his sonnets on such diverse subjects as Pythagoras, Saint Augustine, Saint Kevin, and Saint Illtyd. His images from light, bowls, music, and his sacramental imagery in general are of this description. The inner life has doubtless been by others more subtly and elaborately described but seldom more powerfully indicated. Jones also becomes a connoisseur of sacred ritual, as, for example, in what he evidently regards as the austere primitivism of Zoroastrian worship, the Asiatic opulence of ancient Hebrew rites as implied by Ezekiel, and the erotic mysticism painted in a verse prayer to the saintly Richard Crashaw.

It has been said that aestheticism on the one hand and pietism on the

other occasionally diminish Jones's powers both in religious insight and poetic practice. With the literary inheritances from his earlier days, a certain amount of pre-Raphaelite word-painting, with its shallowness of thought and feeling, became inevitable, and Jones himself privately admitted such limitations. An example is a pretty poem on the amorous meeting of Jacob and Rebecca at the well. Here we have a questionable piece of vivid imagery, even closer, perhaps, to the Imagist, Amy Lowell, than to the pre-Raphaelite, Rossetti. It is Francis Thompson purged of his ingenuity.

A considerable number of Jones's religious poems might be described as Anglo-Catholic window dressing, well executed in certain limited aspects of technique, wanting in the essentials of serious art. In such instances the soul is evoked, not won. Or better, the reader is invited to approach the poem more as a pious exercise than as a serious experience either in religion or poetry. Yet fairness must, I think, recognize in a number of pieces a valid contribution to liturgical art, achieving a conjunction of these two great activities. There is, for example, a run of seven poems in his first serious book, *Sonnets of the Cross,* that may be likened to well designed if not overwhelming representations of the Stations of the Cross. The first of these, which a psychologist would unquestionably find biographical, bears the title, "The Three Mothers." These are Earth, Eve, and Mary. There follow moving poems on the Gospel according to Saint John, the Transfiguration, the Entry into Jerusalem, the Passion, Emmaus, the Ascension. It is a noble sequence. The first mentioned of these may be taken as a meditation on the geneological passage opening the Gospel according to Saint Matthew.

Some of the most refreshing aspects of Jones's writing are literary qualities unquestionably derived in no small part from his religious inspiration, but the projection of this inspiration rather than the essence itself. These fresh contributions, wherein much of Jones's strongest work of necessity lies, are to be found in poems much less liturgically derivative than the group of just mentioned pieces from *Sonnets of the Cross.* We have said that, at his best, Jones is a nature mystic: this is the ground where his youthful subjection to the romantic tradition most fruitfully meets his mature addiction to the metaphysical tradition. But memories grow stale and books report nature at second hand. Cooped in his apartment house shrine in New York, how was he to experience nature? On his several trips to Europe his experience with the preponderately hu-

man and historical world predominated. But two visits to Canada during the period of his greatest imaginative powers presented him with a new landscape and a new legend. To say that nature in Canada is herself fresh, would be from almost any point of view an understatement. Jones was completely entranced. Yet his entire bias of mind would have made the northern landscape barren to him had he not thought of it as scene for the most dramatic of Christian missions, if not of Christian pioneering, the stage on which were played the triumphs and the tragedies told in *The Jesuit Relations.*

On this basis of land and letters, Jones compiled a sequence of twenty-one poems which he entitled "Sonnets of the New World." They are, first of all, perhaps, a contribution to the literature of the French Provinces of Canada, but in a deeper sense, to English poetry and to religious literature in general. They have, in fact, been much admired.

Naturally, the subject matter freed the writer from some of the stuffiness threatening "ecclesiastical sonnets" of any time, or literary sonnets that tend to become merely essays on famous men and events. Here Christianity seems less an end than a means, for the sonnets, like the *Relations* themselves, at their best are even more dramatic than intellectual or devout. With Jones, the drama of nature is quite as powerful as that of the saints or missionaries and in spirit, perhaps, quite as religious as the saintly legend. With his excitement heightened by the stories, he turns to picture a force at least more palpable than that of the heroes of his tale, the force of nature at the northern extremities of an untamed continent. Here the pre-Raphaelite tapestry-effect marring his poem on Jacob and Rebecca almost wholly disappears; images of sight and sound come most vividly to life. Nature is depicted as not merely the garment of God's glory, or the mirror of human passions, but as God's plotted ordeal to try the strength of his champions, a trial not only by fire but by ice, rock, and water. Asceticism appears in a new context. This, too, becomes in an ultimate sense religious and a force in the legitimate province of a religious art. One of the most typical of these poems fusing a northern nature and a mystical religious experience is the sonnet, "Lac de Saint Sacrament," relating how Champlain, on seeing the body of water now most prosaically called Lake George, in its autumn splendor, gave to it the name that he found most fitting to express its transcendent beauty.

It is suggested by this paper that Thomas S. Jones is a poet of some

importance making a serious contribution to our religious literature. He is religious, but he is also a poet. However much might have been gained for the argument in the preceding pages by excerpting certain lines for quotation, much would have been lost in every respect by quoting fragments of these brief pieces. The reader will not wish for prolonged quotation but some explicit evidence he may desire conveniently before him, especially since all Jones's books appeared originally in small editions (though several went through a large number of printings), and all are now out of print. It has seemed best to give here four sonnets, chosen rather arbitrarily but selected to show as much variety as possible.

GAUTAMA

Of highway dust the Buddha made his throne
And spoke of love with breath like meadow balm,—
A beggar's bowl lay on his lifted palm,
But white as stars those hands of healing shone;
And pierced with pity Gautama made known
The light that liberates, the awful calm
About the region of the waiting Brahm,
Whose name is Peace, the Lonely and Alone.

And as he spoke, the common roadway spread
Among the worlds of time and space which bind
The starry soul that wanders fugitive;
And men upon a path of gold were led
Past hells and heavens, birth and death, to find
Love's very Heart wherein all Loves shall live.

OLD MAGIC

As light swings wide the mighty Eastern door,
He comes with crozier and a silver bell
To bless the green wood where the Druids dwell
Alone with colored winds and starry lore;
They hear his feet along the leafy floor
And tremble when he nears their wizard-well,
For shadows of a golden citadel
No longer veil its deeps with faery ore.

All forest wisdom must give way to him:
Never at evening will the speckled wren
Foretell the ages from a dewy thorn,
Nor grey priests watch until the moon grows dim
The milk-white hounds slip through a silent glen
And vanish up the flaming slopes of morn.

THE OLD AGE OF LEONARDO

The masques of life pass by in slow defile:
Musician, painter, sculptor, architect—
Like the bronze horseman all his dreams lie wrecked,
Equivocal as dark Gioconda's smile;
Now strange enigmas his tired mind beguile—
The sky's deep splendor he can still reflect
Within the crystal of his intellect,
And light with darkness swiftly reconcile.

Like tarnished silver, pale and nebular,
His twilight falls; but what last summons wake
That glow upon his face austere and wan?
Is it the evening or the morning star—
The peace of death, or life that bids him take
The sun's path on the white wings of a swan?

PAUL LE JEUNE

He leaves the lodge where drums of darkness roll
And plumed and painted sagamores who wear
Crests of the wolf, the tortoise, and the bear,
Dance to the fiend that conjurers control;
Without, the frost splits branch and silver bole,
Green-icicled against the bitter air
The white weir hangs, and dazzling snow fields glare
Rose-red with flames that rim the frozen pole.

Bleak is the northern night, the clans are wild;
Yet in his heart he hears the blue ice break
And salmon rush beneath the rainbowed falls:
So in the lodge where walrus shields are piled,
The Children of the Forest will awake,
The Breath of Fire beat down their ice-bound walls.

CRITICISM AND FAITH

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By a happy chance recently, I had occasion to read two summaries of the work done in New Testament scholarship during the first half of this century, one in the form of an article, the other a book. Each of the writers was a recognized authority on the subject, and his aim was to show that certain positions are now established beyond dispute, while others have been rendered untenable once for all. Inevitably, there was a good deal of common ground in the two surveys, but the contrast between the results reached was intriguing in the extreme. For, as one read first one account and then the other, it became evident that the established results of this authority were identical with the discredited hypotheses of that one, and vice versa. How is such a contradiction to be explained? Does it not mean that each man tends to regard as generally accepted just what commends itself to his own judgment, while he dismisses as discredited by all what he personally views with disfavor?

To those who are not prepared for so naïve an identification of their own opinions with the final truth or—and this is an alternative explanation—a surrender to the judgment of the majority, the picture will appear different. They will be impressed by the fact that biblical studies resemble nothing so much as one of those troublesome countries in which rebellion breaks out as soon as a stable regime has been established. Today, for example, we are far less confident than we were a generation ago that all problems of Pentateuchal criticism are to be solved in terms of J, E, D, and P, with or without numerals attached. A school has arisen in Scandinavia that accuses Wellhausen of importing Hegelian dialectic into the study of the O.T. and proposes to undo all that has been done under his guidance. It is not only facts that are in question, for a transvaluation of values is threatened also. The priest has been rehabilitated, and the prophet, we are told, was by no means the pioneer and solitary genius we thought him to be.

In the field of N.T. studies the uncertainty is at least as acute; and it is much more serious because it affects what we have always considered the *fundamenta* of the Christian faith. To begin with, it is no small mat-

ter that an important saying of Jesus will be allowed to him by one scholar, while another dismisses it as evident *Gemeindetheologie.* But more is at stake than that. To the question: Did Jesus claim to be Messiah and, if so, in what sense? the only honest answer we can give is that we really do not know. We have a right to our opinions on the subject, but who among us can say that he knows? We must make the same admission if we ask how Jesus interpreted his death, if indeed he foresaw it: again, the data are too scanty to admit of any definitive conclusion. What was in the mind of Jesus when he went to be baptized by John? We do not know. Yet, as Matthew's version of the narrative shows, the implications of the event are of the most serious order. What did he mean by his words and actions at the Last Supper, whatever they were? We can only hazard a guess. Yet would not one of the major items of Christian worship be profoundly disturbed were a different answer from the traditional one to become generally accepted? To sum up, on how to discriminate between what in the Gospels goes back to Jesus himself and what reflects the mind of the Early Church, we have opinion only and not knowledge with any pretence to certainty.

How far-reaching and perplexing this clash of basic judgments is may be shown by the crucial instance of the authorship and therefore the historicity of the Fourth Gospel. There are probably today three opinions. The first and most widely held is that, while there are undoubted differences between John and the Synoptists, they are in fact much nearer to each other than we once imagined. Perhaps there still are those for whom the Fourth Gospel is simply a work of mystical theology indifferent to history, a sort of Philonic version of the Christian message, complete with allegories. But it is still possible for a competent scholar like Friedrich Büchsel, writing the commentary in the *Neues Göttinger Bibelwerk,* to champion apostolic authorship and to draw its logical conclusion. John is the most reliable source we have for the ministry of Jesus, being the one Gospel that comes to us from an eyewitness and an apostle. The Synoptics by comparison are distinctly inferior; they are the work of the second generation of disciples, and, governed as they are by theological presuppositions, they are of value primarily as documents of the Church's faith!

Of course, so high a degree of uncertainty in the conclusions was only to be expected, in view of the scanty material at the scholar's disposal and the inescapable element of subjectivity in the method he adopts,

indeed must adopt. That method consists, here as elsewhere, in formulating a hypothesis and then testing it by using it to interpret the data put at one's disposal by the documents with which one is working. But the hypothesis itself is only obtained in the first instance by concentrating on a selection from those very data, and, since other selections are possible, other candidates are available for the status of hypothesis. If it is argued that, in the end, only one hypothesis is able to explain the facts, and therefore it may be kept and all the others discarded, the answer is that nothing quite as simple and as decisive as this ever really happens. No one hypothesis ever does quite fit all the facts; there is always a residuum that has somehow to be explained away or to be covered by a supplementary hypothesis. Indeed, one has only to murmur the magic word "interpolation," and the most stubborn difficulty disappears.

Thus, if we suppose that Jesus thought of the kingdom of God as present and purely spiritual, the eschatological sections of the Gospels are no evidence against this, for it can be further assumed that they are due to the importation into his teaching of alien ideas derived from late Jewish apocalyptic. To one commentator, the Jewish strain in the Sermon on the Mount shows unmistakably that Matthew's reporting was colored by his Jewish prejudices. But there is equal plausibility in the explanation of the next commentator, for whom the same expressions, precisely because they are so Jewish, must go back to the Master. If we are disposed to think that Jesus envisaged his death as some form of atonement the ransom-passage in Mark 10:45 will support us; if we are of the contrary opinion, it will come to our assistance with equal readiness, for then it will be manifestly a product of the Early Church.

Behind every such attempt at reconstruction, therefore, some value-judgment is operative. But we must now complicate matters still further by pointing out that the value-judgment in a given instance may be less that of the individual scholar than that of his age and milieu. Thus, a generation like our own, that has come to see new significance in the Church and to connect it more closely with the gospel, is predisposed to find the two passages in Matthew in which the word "church" occurs quite possibly original. The eschatological elements in the Gospels are seen in a new light by those who have lived through two world wars and now face the menace of the atom bomb; to carry them back to Jesus is not now to lumber him up with apocalyptic fancies but to credit him with prophetic insight. When Christianity is sharpening up its dog-

matic weapons for the combat with Marxism, it no longer seems derogatory to its Founder to find dogma in his teaching rather than a simple message of the Fatherhood of God. Why, even the new physics extends its influence to the exegesis of the N.T., and the miraculous recovers some of its former prestige.

So the established results we had hoped to contemplate and even to possess are simply not there. Like the poor, subjectivity and uncertainty will be with us always. That, to be sure, means no more than that the limitations attendant upon all historical research apply to the documents of early Christianity as they do to those of early Rome. The method followed, the formation of a hypothesis and the testing of it by reference to the data at the scholar's disposal, is a perilous one, as has been indicated. But it is the only one available and, after all, are we not all in a dangerous situation—except the dead! The only safeguards are those of self-criticism and constant vigilance lest what we want to see should mislead us as to what is actually there to be seen. There is no reason why the trained student should not at times reach conclusions on which he is prepared to stake his credit, though he will be careful to admit that what is so convincing to him may strike another as inconclusive. But alas! even some of our more modest scholars are apt to use unguarded language about "established results" and "consensus of opinion" when they would do better to accept responsibility themselves for what they put forward.

Here, however, I am concerned simply with the religious significance of this ultimate uncertainty in which we find ourselves involved. There are those, of course, who would rejoice in everything that has been said so far—except, significantly enough, the last paragraph—and argue that nothing remains for us but surrender to authority, whether that of the Church or that of the so-called apostolic witness in the N.T. As our neo-orthodox friends are never tired of telling us, all attempts to recover the Jesus of history have broken down. We are left to choose between the Christ of faith and complete scepticism. The Christ of faith is then somewhat ingenuously identified with the Nicene Creed.

The difficulty here is to know exactly what is meant by the apostolic witness and on what grounds it is to be accepted. As I see it, there are three possible grounds. In the first place, we may accept it in sheer submission to authority. But that would make the apostles the primary object of Christian faith and Christ himself secondary to them. Or, sec-

ondly, by a process of historical investigation, we may reach the conclusion that the documents of the N.T. are early in date, primary in origin, and historically reliable. But that is to give up the whole case, for it is to concede that patient, cautious, and self-critical enquiry can lead us to something better than an impasse. Thirdly, it may be meant that the figure of Christ, as we are introduced to him by the N.T. writers, is self-authenticating, possesses an inherent spiritual power that wins our allegiance. I would agree, but I would not allow that this binds us fast to any particular Christology or forbids our submitting even the earliest and best witnesses to a cross-examination.

So we return to our question of how it is that we are denied any guarantee of the historical events that lie at the foundation of our faith. How is it—to put the extreme case—that there is no final answer to the pathologist who would classify as self-delusion the sense of mission and the nearness to the Father in which Jesus lived? The answer is that here, as elsewhere, certainty of knowledge must be denied if the certitude of faith is to be made possible. Faith and uncertainty are correlates, so that, in the nature of the case, we can only believe in a God of whose existence there are no irrefragable proofs. Possibilities, probabilities there may be, but no demonstration. He lives most faithfully with God who has faced and overcome the awful possibility that he may not be at all. So it is not sufficient that loyalty to Christ should be tried by the minor temptations of a world that seldom conforms to his truth; it must be subjected also sometimes to the major temptation that arises when it seems possible that there is nothing there to command loyalty.

If Christ were given to us in the same solid and matter-of-fact way as, let us say, the census returns, that would doubtless add to our information, it would not kindle the imagination and enlist the will. A certificate to the physical resurrection, signed by Pilate and Caiaphas, would reduce to a minimum the wonder that lies in a present-day encounter with him. If we could solve our problems and reach those established results to which we aspire, we should defeat in so doing the purposes of religion. We should be left merely with a known and measurable entity within the province of the historian of antiquity. Only as what he in fact is, as a strange compound of actuality and mystery, with no man knowing for certain where one ends and the other begins, can Christ be for us a source of spiritual life. We have faith, hope, and

love; we have also enough knowledge to make adventure promising, but never enough to render us content and secure.

Each man therefore must wrestle for himself with this uncertainty from which there is no escape, that he may make contact with Christ in a spiritual experience that is his very own. He must read the Gospels for himself and make his own attempt to reconstruct the Jesus of history, refusing to take him over at secondhand, whether from ancient churches or from modern scholarship. For—and this is really the conclusion of the whole matter—the quest of the historical Jesus is not in vain, it is one form under which it is possible to meet with Jesus in the present. We must devote ourselves to this, refusing to be satisfied with less than finality, though in so doing we learn that finality moves with us and is always beyond our reach. In the effort we shall arrive at something much more precious, the renewal of our own spiritual life. Of course the enterprise is attended with danger, the danger above all of not finding Jesus, but of forcing our own presuppositions and standards upon him. But, as was said above, truth is nowhere to be attained under easier conditions than conscientiousness and self-criticism.

This is not to suggest that the guesswork of the amateur is of equal value with the specialist's research. Yet if the amateur allows the specialist to do his work for him, he is taking over his religion from someone else. The gains of a personal discovery of Jesus are, after all, spiritual rather than scientific gains, and these are open to every man. There are many ways in which we can enter upon the life of the spirit or enlarge it. Not the least important among these is that we should say to those who have bound a greater figure than Lazarus, "Loose him and let him go!" And if Schweitzer interposes here his warning that to meet the historical Jesus may be less pleasant than we think, since we shall find in him a man of his own time and not of ours, has he not answered his own objection? For is not his life of unselfish service our best contemporary evidence that, through a personal effort to know Jesus as he actually was, we can come face to face with him as spiritually arisen among men?

BOOK REVIEWS

The Origins and History of Religions. By JOHN MURPHY. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. vii, 454 pp. $6.00.

What impresses one most about this book is its catholicity of spirit and the extent of its purview, both spatial and temporal. Not only does it give an account of the national, or racial, religions of the Hebrews, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Hindus, the Chinese, and the Japanese, as well as of such advanced religions as Buddhism, Muhammadanism, Zoroastrianism, Mandaeanism, and Jainism, it also reviews the development of religion from pre-historic times to the modern era. Where so much has been attempted within relatively short compass the treatment inevitably suffers to some extent from undue brevity, which will probably lead the reader to wish that the work had been expanded to include a second volume, in order that a number of topics, lightly touched upon, might have received a fuller consideration.

One of the most interesting portions of the book is that which comprises the first two chapters, wherein the author discusses the method which he intends to employ. He begins by distinguishing it from two other methods which he does not entirely disown, but regards as less satisfactory. The first of these is the comparative method, which proceeds by noting similarities and differences, and thereby succeeds in differentiating the various religions into the following groups: (1) Monotheistic, (2) Polytheistic, (3) Pantheistic, (4) Animistic, (5) Primitive or Mana Religions. This classification is, of course, too important to be disregarded, and it remains permanently in the background as a constant standard of reference. The second method is the historical or "vertical" method, which employs the category of evolution, as well as the closely allied notion—the "counter-category," may we term it?—of degeneracy, and concerns itself with the succession of types and the transition from one to another. This is a method which, Dr. Murphy believes, has been overworked by Tylor, Frazer, and Spencer. In reaction against it, as he frankly states, another method has been developed which he decides to adopt—namely, the cultural method, based upon the notion of "horizons."

> It has been considered by this school of thought better to let each culture-horizon, as it were, speak for itself, in its well-defined character as a whole constituted of man and his environment both material and human, both natural

and sociological, without stressing as these early masters in the science had tended to do its having evolved out of something else, or its passing onwards into something different (p. 9).

One would welcome at this point a detailed comparison of the two methods, so that we might grasp the inadequacies of the former and the merits of the latter. The cultural method, as our author recognizes, is itself based upon the notion of evolution, but one gathers that it views the entire process, as it were, at greater distance, and that it is inspired by some sort of "holistic" concept upon which further light might profitably have been shed.

The culture-horizons are five in number. The first is that of food-gatherers and hunters, whose religions are of the Mana, i.e., the pre-animistic type. The second is that of the Animistic religions. The third is the Agricultural Horizon which develops coincidentally with the domestication of plants and animals. This stage is characterized by the worship of a mother-goddess or Earth-mother and of the heavenly bodies. The fourth is the Civilized Horizon, and here religion takes the form of a fully developed polytheism, often accompanied by the recognition of one of the gods as a supreme monarch. Lastly, we have the Prophetic Horizon, which originated about 2000 B.C. Subsequent to this date appeared the great individuals, the religious teachers and philosophers, who have so profoundly influenced the history of mankind, and to whose activities the advanced religions trace their origins.

This discussion of method is followed by a number of chapters dealing with anthropological material, and with such topics as Animatism, Animism, Totemism and Tabu, after which our author opens his account of the various ethnic faiths. What is of special interest is the attention which Dr. Murphy devotes to the processes of degeneration and reversion. Despite the exaggerated importance attributed to these by Father Schmidt, whose doctrine of primitive monotheism is—rightly, I believe, but all too briefly—dismissed, Dr. Murphy urges with much plausibility that too little consideration has been bestowed upon these factors. Furthermore, at a time when so much nonsense has been talked by Nazis and Fascists about racial superiority, and probably an equal amount by Communists and extreme democrats about racial equality, it is a relief to find a writer who neither fulminates nor vituperates but is prepared seriously to examine the question of racial capacity in its relation to religious development.

What is, perhaps, of greater importance is the fact that now, when so many investigators are sceptical of any attempt to trace religion to a single origin, and of the assumption that it must everywhere evolve through the same successive stages in the same order, and are even inclined to dismiss the whole question of ultimate origins as exceeding the limits of empirical inquiry, Dr. Murphy comes forward as a champion of the Animatistic or Mana theory. And what disquiets this reviewer is the conviction that Animatism has been defined far too broadly and Animism far too narrowly. Animatism, we are told, is a "stage of primitive belief represented by some savages of to-day, when the mind sees life in things, mysterious life, without ascribing to them soul or possession by a spirit" (p. 70). And we are also told that

> it may be taken as probable that, at the stage of man's religious development prior to the emergence of the idea of soul, before he acquired the capacity to distinguish clearly between animate and inanimate and between matter and spirit, this rudimentary conception known conveniently as *mana*, with its three almost constant constituents of power, life and will in the objects of his reverence, was the universal form which the religious tendency took in the mind of primitive man (p. 77).

"Animism, indeed," asserts Dr. Murphy, "is only possible when early or primitive man has arrived at a certain degree of mental power or savage culture, when he is able to make the distinction between matter and spirit, or between soul and body" (p. 70).

If by this Dr. Murphy means that the animist must be able to conceive of inert, lifeless, unextended matter, on the one hand, and of unextended, living, conscious spirit, on the other, it seems probable that Plato was the first animist in the Western world, for it is quite evident that the outlook of the Pre-Socratics was thoroughly hylezoistic. The distinction between hylezoism and metaphysical dualism is certainly an important one both for philosophy and for religion. But there is another distinction which, for religion, is at least equally important, and which ought not to be slurred over. It is the distinction between the notion of a rite which is expected to function *ex opere operato* and that of a living, conscious, responsive intelligence, whether that intelligence be thought of as embodied or as bodiless. With such an intelligence man can enter into personal relations; with a mere mysterious power he cannot do so. The man who attributes life and volition to the sacred object stands on the side of the animist.

As a matter of fact, Dr. Murphy would probably recognize that there is some substance in this criticism, for he has himself conceded that

> it is not even possible to separate Mana from spirit, or its somewhat impersonal power from an association with personal existence, in many cases, as in Animism proper; and clearly any mysterious object or power to which the savage tends to ascribe life, and to attribute will, that is, the rudimentary inclination to respond to inducement or coercion, is on the way to the idea of personal spirit (p. 71).

And again he writes:

> As with all Mana beliefs, it is not possible to separate this ascription of power for good or ill to mysterious objects or phenomena from the Animism or belief in the existence of personal spirits which is the next step generally in man's religious development. The reason is that there is the frequent or almost invariable association of life with the mysterious power, and there is added to these the further element of will; and thus all three together—the power to affect one for good or ill connected with awe of the mystery, the life which involves movement from place to place so as to be strangely independent of distance, and the will which implies almost a consciousness of prayer or spell directed to it, slip very easily into the idea of a spirit, a demon or a minor god (p. 354).

Quite so. What, then, is gained by trying to maintain a distinction which is so nebulous?

As to the other distinction, that between the notion of a rite which works of itself and the notion of a conscious being who can be cajoled or commanded, it is obviously closely connected with that between magic and religion. We all used to know what the distinction was. Magic involved constraint or control, religion propitiation. But this sharp distinction, so Dr. Murphy informs us, is no longer retained by anthropology (p. 43). "Magic," he writes, "is indistinguishable from religion, and religion from magic, among primitive and savage people, because in both it is always something done, a rite performed, which brings about the desired end" (p. 17). Let us grant that such is the case. Primitive rite will then constitute a common matrix out of which both magic and religion have evolved. But, once they *have* evolved, how are they to be distinguished? Dr. Murphy himself refers to spirits which "are treated as perilous until mastered by magic or conciliated by religion or made harmless or friendly by a combination of both" (p. 102), and, in so doing, he is obviously reverting to the outmoded basis of distinc-

tion. Yet, if it be outmoded, we ought to be told what we are to put in its place.

I have emphasized these points because of their basic importance, but there are others where a more extended discussion is really required. Dr. Murphy acquiesces too easily in Rhys Davids' interpretation of Nirvana, and in Dr. Hopkins' assurance that Zoroaster was a monotheist and not a dualist. I should be sorry, however, to give the impression that such defects of treatment as I seem to discern—largely due, no doubt, to the need for compression—impugn the value of the book as a whole. To do so would be as ungenerous as it would be unjustifiable. Let me, then reiterate in other words what I said at the outset. The book is broad in scope, scholarly in treatment, illuminating in detail, stimulating in its manner of presentation, an excellent introduction to a subject of major importance. The reader will close with the wish that there were more of it.

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The Upanishads. Translated by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. Vol. I: *Katha, Iśa, Kena, and Mundaka.* Vol. II: *Śvetāśvatara, Praśna, and Māndukya with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā.* New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949, 1952. xiv, 319 pp.; x, 390 pp. $3.50; $4.50.

Swami Nikhilananda of the Ramakrishna Mission in New York is engaged upon a project of translating from the Sanskrit eleven major Upanishads, namely the seven mentioned in the titles of the two volumes here being noticed, and the Taittirīya, Aitareya, Bṛhadāraṇyaka, and Chāndogya, which are still to appear. The translations of the separate Upanishads are accompanied by essays and copious expository notes, some of which are drawn from his own reflection and some from the commentaries of Śankara (Śankarācārya). Each volume has also a long introductory essay, that of Volume I being entitled "Discussion of Brahman in the Upanishads" (82 pages), and that of Volume II, "Hindu Ethics" (34 pages). The essays, introductions, invocations, and notes take up by far the greater part of the work; translation appears to be about ten percent of the total.

In looking at the Upanishads, Swami Nikhilananda sees them as expositions of the doctrine of unqualified monism *(advaita)*, "non-dualism" in his terminology, as taught by Śankarāçārya. He is entirely frank about this and, in being so, gives warning to his readers that what he is offering is a sectarian interpretation. This is the first respect in which his translation differs from that of Robert E. Hume (2nd ed., 1931), the standard English rendering, which favors none of the later Hindu schools but seeks to interpret the Upanishads only in their own period in the development of Hindu thought.

The difficulty of translating the texts is well known; it lies not so much in the words, forms, and syntax, though these can be bothersome enough, as in grasping the connotations and implications and following the line of reasoning. That is why a close rendering, which does not commit itself to interpretative paraphrase, is forbidding to those westerners who demand a clear message at the cost of accuracy. Swami Nikhilananda's rendering is frequently not a close one. He does indeed, in the Preface to Volume I, call it "literal," but there are many passages in which it is obviously not. This is the second important respect in which his translation differs from Hume's. A few illustrative examples may be cited from the early parts of the Śvetāśvatara Upanishad.

In 1.2 of that text the Sanskrit reading is: *kālasvabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam / saṃyoga eṣāṃ na tv ātmabhāvād ātmāpy anīśaḥ sukhaduḥkhahetoḥ*. The stanza answers a question of the preceding stanza, "What is the cause? Brahma?" A close translation, following Hume with only a few minor verbal changes, would be: "Time, or inherent nature, or necessity, or chance, or the elements, or a womb, or a (male) person should be considered [the cause]; not a combination of these, because of the existence of the ātman; the ātman also is impotent over the causes of pleasure and pain." Nikhilananda renders:

> Should time, or nature, or necessity, or chance, or the elements be regarded as the cause? Or he who is called the purusha, the living self? The cause cannot be the combination of these entities, since there is a living self, ātman, for whose sake the combination has been made; yet neither is the ātman the cause, for it, in turn, is dependent upon good and evil.

Aside from his translation of *yoniḥ* (womb) as "cause," which seems precluded by its inclusion with other terms in the *iti*-clause, the translation passes over to interpretation, adding at least one phrase ("for

whose sake the combination has been made") which has no basis at all in the text.

A few stanzas farther on the text (1.9) reads: *jñājñau dvāv ajāv īśānīśāv ajā hy ekā bhoktṛbhogārthayuktā / anantaś cātmā viśvarūpo hy akartā trayaṃ yadā vindate brahman etat.* Again, following Hume with a few slight alterations, this means:

> There are two (masculine) unborn ones: the knowing (Lord) and the unknowing (individual soul), the omnipotent and the impotent. One feminine (Nature, *prakṛti*), too, is unborn; she is connected with the enjoyer and the objects of enjoyment. And the soul is infinite, universal, inactive. When one finds out the triad, that is Brahma.

Nikhilananda translates:

> The Supreme Lord appears as Iśvara, omniscient and omnipotent, and as the jiva, of limited knowledge and power, both unborn. [But this does not deny the phenomenal universe;] for there exists further the unborn prakriti, which creates [the ideas of] the enjoyer, enjoyment, and the object. Ātman is infinite and all-pervading, and therefore devoid of agency. When the seeker knows all these three to be Brahman, he is freed from his fetters.

Two stanzas later, in 1.11, the text says in Hume's translation, "By knowing God *(deva)* there is a falling off of all fetters; with distresses destroyed, there is cessation of birth and death. By meditating upon him there is a third stage at the dissolution of the body, even universal lordship; being absolute *(kevala),* his desire is satisfied." The text speaks only of three states, but Nikhilananda expands the meaning by finding a reference here to the fourth *(turīya)* or superconscious state, which is discussed in the Māṇḍukya Upanishad but not in the Śvetāśvatara. He says, for the latter half of the stanza: "From meditation on Him there arises, after the dissolution of the body, the third state, that of universal lordship. And lastly, the aspirant, transcending that state also, abides in the complete bliss of Brahman." For his final sentence the Sanskrit has only *kevala āptakāmaḥ,* literally "absolute, with desires satisfied."

An even more extreme departure from a "literal" rendering is that of 2.1 (a stanza quoted from the Taittirīya Saṃhitā). The text reads: *yuñjānaḥ prathamaṃ manas tattvāya savitā dhiyaḥ / agner jyotir nicāyya pṛthivyā adhy ābharat.* Hume translates literally: "Savitṛi (the Inspirer), first controlling mind and thought for truth, discerned the light of Agni (Fire) and brought it out of the earth." Nikhilananda's

version scarcely seems to refer to the same text; it is: "May the Sun, at the commencement of yoga, join our minds and other organs to the Supreme Self so that we may attain the Knowledge of Reality. May He, also, support the body, the highest material entity, through the powers of the deities who control the senses." This is not a translation at all, though Nikhilananda gives no hint of the fact, but an interpretation, and an esoteric one at that.

These examples should be sufficient to show the method of the translation. It would seem fairer to his users for Swami Nikhilananda to have given a more exact rendering, and to have reserved the interpretation for the expository notes, which are copious enough to have admitted it. His translation, though possibly easier reading than Hume's, cannot be considered to supersede it.

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Cittavisuddhiprakarana of Aryadeva. Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts. Edited by Prabhubhai Bhikhabhai Patel. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949. xxix, 111 pp. Rs. 5.

Chang-Chen Lun, Karatalaratna, or the Jewel in Hand, by . . . Bhāvaviveka. Translated into Sanskrit from the Chinese . . . by N. Aiyaswami Sastri. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949. xvi, 124 pp. Rs. 5.

Abhidharma-Samuccaya of Asanga. Edited by Pralhad Pradhan. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1950. 31, 110 pp. Rs. 6.

Arthapada Sutra . . . translated by . . . Che-Kien under the Wu dynasty. Parts I and II. Translated by P. V. Bapat. 21, 181, viii pp. Rs. 7.

Mahāyāna. By Bhadanta Śāntibhikṣu. [In Hindi]. Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, n.d. 30, 150 pp.

These are all publications of the Visva-Bharati ("All-India University") at Santiniketan, in Bengal, founded by Rabindranath Tagore. It is a leading center in India for Buddhist studies, especially North-Buddhist, whether in Sanskrit, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, Tibetan, or Chinese. It has, in fact, initiated serious studies in the two last named languages in India, and greatly stimulated the study of Buddhist works in Indic languages. The first four titles are Numbers 8, 9, 12, and 13 of

"Visva-Bharati Studies," a valuable series of research publications. It is interesting to note that the four authors appear to have been respectively a Gujerati, a Tamil, a Bihari, and a Maratha: all from other provinces than Bengal, three geographically remote from it. It is, then, a really "all-Indian" scholarly movement. The author of the second work is now a professor at the Visva-Bharati. All four are creditable works of scholarship.

The first is an edition of a Sanskrit work in 134 verses, with the texts of two Tibetan translations. The editor considers it "one of the most important texts of the Mantrayānists, probably of the Yogatantrayāna school of the Vajrayāna" (a Tantric form of Buddhism, this work apparently showing affinities with the "left-hand" Tantrists). The second is a translation into Sanskrit of the Chinese translation of a lost Indic work on logic, belonging to the "Svātantrika-Sautrāntika" school, according to the translator. (This work has been earlier translated into French by La Vallée Poussin.) The third is an edition of a Mahāyāna work in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. The original manuscript was discovered in Tibet by M. P. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyayana, who brought back the photographs on which the edition is based. However, the manuscript is fragmentary, and the major part of the text is reconstructed by the editor from a Tibetan translation (a common procedure, made relatively easy by the wooden literalness of Tibetan translators). The fourth is a translation of a Chinese work corresponding to the Pāli Aṭṭhaka-vaggika (or -vaggiya), an ancient part of the canon (chiefly verses) imbedded in the Suttanipāta. The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit equivalent is called Artha- (or Arthaka-) vargīya; it is referred to in several BHS works (see my forthcoming Dictionary of BHS), but the text is known only in a few fragments published by Hoernle in JRAS, 1916 and 1917. Mr. Bapat thinks the traditional interpretation of the Pāli title (Aṭṭhaka- = Skt. Aṣṭaka-, "group of eight") is original, and the BHS Artha(ka)- a secondary distortion. Sylvain Lévi (J.A.s., 1915, 1, p. 413) held the contrary view.

The fifth title is not numbered as a volume of the Visva-Bharati Studies, although on the back cover appears, in Devanāgarī, the name Viśvabhāratī Gaveṣaṇā Granthamālā ("Visva-Bharati Research Series"). It is a modern treatise on Mahāyāna Buddhism in Hindi, presumably (since the author's name and title indicate that he is a Buddhist monk) a work of missionary propaganda, or, at least, popularization. The re-

viewer has not read it, and so cannot estimate what value it may have, from these or any other points of view; it is, however, certainly interesting that such a work has been published in India.

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The Doctrine of Awakening: A Study on the Buddhist Ascesis. By J. EVOLA. Tr. from the Italian by H. E. MUSSON. London: Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1951. ix, 310 pp. 21s.

Buddhism: Its Essence and Development. By EDWARD CONZE. With a preface by ARTHUR WALEY. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. 212 pp. $6.00.

Two completely different modes of approach are represented in these recent accounts of Buddhism. J. Evola, obviously dominated by the concept of Aryan racial superiority, concentrates on original Buddhist doctrine as setting forth in purest form a discipline (ascesis) in accordance with "the fundamental traditions and highest metaphysical concepts of the Aryan races." Edward Conze, seeing in Buddhism "a part of the common human heritage of wisdom, by which men have succeeded in overcoming this world, and in gaining immortality, or a deathless life," traces the wide variety of Buddhist thought in all its historic forms. For one, the Buddhist way is aristocratic, exclusive, something for the select, superior few. For the other, it is the manifestation of a universal spiritual impulse which, in its expanding development, has elaborated ever new means of salvation suited to differing varieties of aspiring human nature.

Evola's treatment in his *The Doctrine of Awakening* is limited to emphasis on early dogma, biased by preconceptions worked out in his *Rivolto contro il mondo moderno* (Milan, 1934) and *Sintesi di dottrina della razza* (Milan, 1941). Yet it has the advantage of a certain close-knit concentration. It rests exclusively upon the Sutta Piṭaka of the Pāli canon and organizes ideas found in the Majjhima, Dīgha, Saṁyutta, and Anguttara nikāyas. The analysis proceeds logically from its presuppositions. Quite frankly, the author states that he discusses Buddhism because it is "best suited for examination as a comprehensive and universal ascetic system that is clear and undiluted, well tried and well set

out, in tune with the spirit of Aryan man and yet prevailing in the modern age" (p. 5). It is a technique for developing an interior force that is clearly conscious; it is superior to morality, which for it has a purely instrumental value; and it has something of the "dignity and impersonality of a science" (p. 8). This technique, Evola holds, is objective, free from all religious, theological, or ethical mythology, and is inexorably directed toward an impersonal, unconditioned ultimate. In these and other characteristics he sees the "Aryan-ness" of Buddha's doctrine and, in a chapter on The Historical Place of the Doctrine," he proceeds to link it with traditions of the Indo-Aryan conquerors of India.

The author shows himself well acquainted with the Pāli Suttas in his expositions. To the present reviewer, however, his handling of his material appears unnecessarily slanted by racial assumptions. It is true that the term *ariya* appears throughout the literature of the Pāli texts. It is also true that the founder of Buddhism came from the warrior nobility of the proud Sākiya tribe. But to assume from these facts that his doctrine of awakening emerged as a reflection of this Aryan nobility and this warrior spirit appears gratuitous. By universal Buddhist tradition Gotama left the ties of family, clan, and tribe in order to seek enlightenment, and he received into his order earnest seekers from all groups. The *ariyānam,* the Āryas or Elect Ones, are excellent, not in the sense of race or caste, but in the sense of spiritual nobility, rightness, and goodness. As S. Radhakrishnan has pointed out in his recent translation of the Dhammapada (Oxford, 1950, vs. 22), the Āryas are "those who have entered on the path that leads to sanctification." They are the noble ones who do not injure others but have compassion for all living creatures (cf. vs. 270 and accompanying comment). Their high discipline for achieving selflessness, which is indeed well analyzed by Evola, is not merely for the attainment of a "calm and composed consciousness of nobility and superiority" (Evola, p. 116), but for a transcendence of contingency which frees them to profounder service of suffering humanity. Such service Evola's position either makes adventitious (cf. p. 296) or discounts as a Mahāyāna degeneration into a religious and equalitarian "generosity" (pp. 277 f.).

In contrast to Evola's concentrated and strictly controlled view of an original essence of Buddhism, Conze's outlook over the subject is wide-

sweeping and more historically adequate. His aim is "to describe the living tradition of Buddhism throughout the centuries" (p. 27). He finds common ground in the essential documents of Pāli, Chinese, and Tibetan literature—traditions concerning the Buddha, the famous Four Truths, and the characteristics of the monastic order. He sets forth basic doctrines of the Old Wisdom School (i.e., Hīnayāna), following up their developments into the New Wisdom School (Mahāyāna). He shows the natural emergence of the later ideas of Bodhisattvas, Emptiness, Salvation by Knowledge, by Faith and Devotion. In separate chapters he treats also of the Mind-only theory of the Yogacarins, and of the Tantra or Magical Buddhism.

It is noteworthy that Conze rejects the idea that all later Buddhist history represents a "degeneration" from an "original" pure gospel. For one thing, all attempts (such as those of Mrs. Rhys Davids, H. J. Jennings, and P. Dahlke and, we may add, of J. Evola) to get at a distinct, original message of Buddha are in the nature of the case reconstructions. For another, such a conception is "like regarding an oak tree as a degeneration of an acorn" (p. 27). Instead of this, Conze sees the full dimension of Buddhist doctrine as comprising "all those teachings which are linked to the original teaching by historical continuity" (p. 28) and which present methods for achieving selflessness. This perspective enables him to detect authentic insights in Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika teachings, in Prajñāpāramitā scriptures, in Bodhisattva doctrine, and in the penetrating reflections of Nāgārjuna, Asanga, and Vasubandhu. Even Tantric Buddhism, involved in numerous primitive, magical ways of acting and thinking, and usually regarded as the nadir of departure from original teaching and practice, is seen to preserve continuity as an extraordinarily antinomian form of winning emancipation from the fetters of existence.

Both Evola and Conze treat of the Zen form of Buddhism in Japan, but with characteristic differences in evaluating its relation to militarism. For Evola, Zen marks a rejection of decadent Mahāyānism and a return to the esoteric Aryan ascesis, which is found most congenial to Japanese warrior nobility. For Conze, Zen (or Ch'an) marks a revolt from traditionalism and metaphysics, together with a re-emphasis on firsthand experience of enlightenment. He recognizes that its simplicity and straightforward character did appeal to men of the military class, but it was originally loyal to orthodox Buddhist ethics, the path of

right. Only when it deviated from this orthodoxy and drew the inference that "one need not adhere to the minor prescriptions of discipline" and so cultivated a moral indifference, did it become adjusted to fall in with the demands of Japanese militarism (cf. p. 204). In this connection it may be remarked that Evola seems to see the Zen Sect of Japan in terms of its Rinzai branch, while Conze's interpretation comports more with the ethical teachings of the Soto branch. For it is Rinzai which is the Zen of the warrior and Soto which is the Zen of the common people.

On the whole, in these two expositions of Buddhism, Conze does more justice to the ultimately living features of Buddhist thought and practice. Evola's reconstruction of an esoteric, absolute Aryan technique (ascesis) is little likely to appeal, except to the few who find his presuppositions congenial. Judging by the contrasting results flowing from the two methods followed, it would appear that for Western understanding of Eastern religions and philosophies, objective, historical procedure is best. Certainly, Conze's recognition of a universal element in the Buddhist goal of salvation accounts more intelligibly for the wide spread and variety of the faith than does Evola's distillation of a high ascesis of an Aryan elite, which leaves these realities of history unexplained except in terms of degeneration and corruption by "the worthless mass of ordinary beings" (p. 239).

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Philosophies of India. By HEINRICH ZIMMER. Edited by JOSEPH CAMPBELL. (Bollingen Series XXVI). New York: Pantheon Books, 1951. xvii, 687 pp., 12 pls. $6.00.

After Dr. Zimmer's sudden death in 1943, Professor Campbell, of Sarah Lawrence College, set himself the tremendous task of editing, from the author's notes, the present volume. Some of the material had been used by Dr. Zimmer in a series of lectures he gave at Columbia University in the spring of 1942 and was almost ready for publication. The rest was in the state of mere jottings and preliminary drafts, and here the editor's task set in of filling gaps with other manuscript material and remembered conversations, and even, at the end, using data from

other sources to fill out the structure. That the work before us conveys so continuously the author's original vision is due to Professor Campbell's painstaking efforts. He also supplied cross-references and an appendix on the Six Systems [of Indian Philosophy] and furnished the book with a bibliography and indices. Twelve beautifully illustrative plates accompany the text.

It was Dr. Zimmer's special gift to approach his subject as a whole; to see it, not as a separate unit, but in its proper place in the world order, and to illustrate it with pertinent stories and myths. In this he resembled the Indian philosophers who, together with their teachings, form the special subject of this book.

Dr. Zimmer sets out to show that we, in the West, have come to a crossroads where we view with interest any solution to our problems that may have been found in India centuries ago. Philosophy for most of us has become the mere critical seeking of information, whereas its aim should be man's transformation, as in India. It now seeks again to take the place of religion—which itself has been devalued in the West—in giving a response to the primary questions in our minds. This was its aim with such ancient philosophers as Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, and others, and this is still its aim in the East. Indian philosophy has remained true to this tradition and has worked side by side with religion rather than with natural science.

Four aims of life are recognized in India: (1) material possessions *(artha);* (2) pleasure and love *(kāma);* (3) religious and moral duties *(dharma);* and (4) spiritual release *(mokṣa),* which represents the ultimate aim. The first three of these aims belong to the first stages of an individual's life, and only after they have been successfully accomplished, should man turn his thoughts to final release. A special literature is devoted to each of these aims, but the greatest by far applies itself to liberation from ignorance and from illusion. *Mokṣa* is the practical discipline of metaphysics, which the West has lacked since the middle of the eighteenth century, an optimistic view of evolution having taken its place. Our religion and philosophy have become transformed into science, technology, and economics, whereas in India life and the cosmos are still viewed as a whole.

There, philosophy is a way of life, that is, the personality and conduct of the philosopher are identical with his teaching. It is imparted, in secret, from master to the qualified pupil who approaches him, not

with criticism but with faith. This secret knowledge gives the power of obtaining a divine state both in this world and hereafter. Where wisdom molds the whole of the personality, its effect is the magical power that Mahātma Gandhi, for instance, used to exercise upon the masses. This power at its highest is called Brahman.

Before going into the techniques of power through release developed in the different philosophical systems of India, Dr. Zimmer devotes one chapter each to the three philosophies of worldly life: the political doctrines of the literature called *arthaśāstra;* the psychological ones of the *kāmaśāstra,* and the ethical ones of the *dharmaśāstra.*

The ruthless and realistic Indian theories of politics are founded upon its cruel history of invasions through the ages. Dr. Zimmer, with great skill, applies them also to the history of modern times. They were expounded mostly by way of the beast fable which, through its collection in the *Pañcatantra,* has widely influenced European literature. Indian kingship lacks the prestige of divine right, but India preserved the ancient mythical ideal of a just and virtuous world-monarch, the *cakravartin,* who, in the Buddhist conception, became the secular counterpart of the Buddha.

The chapter on the philosophy of pleasure is a preliminary sketch only, containing little more than a description of *kāma-loka,* "the realm of desires," in Buddhist and Hindu iconography, and a discussion of the magic essence of *kāma.* These notes were to be followed by an analysis of the Indian textbooks on poetics and acting.

The philosophy of duty treats of the caste system in India, in which the author recognizes the specially Indian ideal of virtue: perfection in one's given role. This is recognized in the "Act of Truth": the ancient belief that whosoever has enacted faithfully his own *dharma,* can work miracles by calling that fact to witness. This principle of the power of truth was applied politically by Ghandi in his program of *satyāgraha,* "holding to the truth."

In Part III, Dr. Zimmer views the philosophies of eternity: Jainism, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, Brahmanism, Buddhism, and Tantra. In contrast to most Western scholars, he regarded Jainism as the oldest of the heterodox systems, that is those not founded on the authority of the Vedas, as Brahmanism. These he believed to represent the ideas of the non-Āryan peoples of India. Sāṅkhya and Yoga, theory and practice of a single philosophy, formed a psychological sophistication of the profoundly

pessimistic and radically dualistic principles of Jainism, and, in their turn, anticipated Buddhism. In Sāṅkhya and Yoga, the pre-Āryan philosophy finally became more acceptable to orthodox Brahmanism, until it formed one of the most important portions of classic Hindu philosophical tradition. The *Bhagavad Gītā* is the classic document of the first stages of this co-ordination of all the basic disciplines, Āryan and pre-Āryan, of India.

Vedic philosophy, from its beginning, has been the search for a basic unity underlying the changes of the Universe. This unity was recognized, microcosmically in the Self *(ātman)* and, macrocosmically, in the Holy Power *(brahman)*. The ancient Vedic pantheon was not dethroned, as in Greece, but now served as symbol and manifestation of the higher power. Not only the gods, however, but the whole outer world diminished in importance while this search for the Self went on. This Self was represented in early Vedic philosophy as the paramount controller and, at the same time, as the unconcerned witness. The pre-Āryan philosophies, on the other hand, assigned a completely passive role to the Self. The absolute inactivity of the Self came to prevail in the final, post-Buddhistic period of Vedic thinking, the Vedānta. Here, the characteristics of the liberated man are those of the "divine man on earth,"—an ideal that has inspired India as the image of the knight inspired the Middle Ages.

In the last chapters of this book, those on Buddhism and Tantra, the author's notes became very sparse, which is all the more to be regretted since he had devoted much time during his later life to the latter. (This interest in Tantra was shared by his friend, Carl G. Jung.) He finds that the most original traits of Buddhism were negative ones. At a time when philosophical theorizing flourished in India, the Buddha resolutely denied an answer to theoretical questions, limiting himself to a practical cure for the ills of existence. He proclaimed his doctrine against his will and only to those who wanted to hear it; that it should have become a world religion—due to the expanding colonization of its royal supporters—is only another of its paradoxes.

Later Buddhism, known as the "Great Vehicle," developed on similar lines as its contemporary, Tāntric philosophy. Final release became meaningless where everything was void. Devotion *(bhakti)* now became the aim, for the Bodhisattva to his teaching and, similarly, for the Tāntric devotee to the Goddess. For Brahman, the "highest power,"

now is identified with Śakti, the female energy whose play creates, preserves, and destroys the world. Tāntric philosophy helped to reinstate the pre-Āryan form of the Mother Goddess, who is a chief divinity in popular Hinduism today. Both Tantra and Hinduism adhere to the Vedic tradition but shift their accent to the positive aspect of *māyā*, "world illusion" personified by the goddess. It is only since the Tāntric system has been studied and appreciated in the West that we have received a new understanding of Indian life and art: namely, that, along with an attitude of negation and renunciation, there has always existed a vigorous affirmation of the world of names and forms.

This book will be welcomed by those who prefer the comprehensive view of a people's ideals to the analytical description of them.

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Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought. By ROBERT M. GRANT. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1952. 293 pp. $4.50.

Professor Robert Grant of Sewanee has performed a useful service in presenting the results of his researches during his recent study in Holland on Carnegie and Guggenheim awards. His book is something of a medley and does not keep strictly to its title. It ranges over a wide field of ancient science and Christian theology. Yet the material collected will be of no small value to those who wish to pursue the study of religion and science in the ancient world.

The book, indeed, is really about two different, though related, topics. The first part is a survey of science in ancient thought. It extends into Judaism and early Christianity, and treats such subjects as Nature, Laws of Nature, Matter and Motion, Credibility, Credulity, and so on. On all these points Dr. Grant has something important to say, and he has prepared his material from a wide and diligent reading of the sources, which is carefully indicated in the footnotes. He tends, however, to leave the reader with a large number of facts and references, rather than with a clear grasp of the basic issues. Yet he makes clear the extent to which the scientific spirit of observation declined in the Hellenistic period represented by philosophers and rhetoricians.

The second section is on "Christianity." It treats of Omnipotence, Creation, Nature Miracles and Resurrection in biblical and patristic thought. Here again, a great deal of information is brought together and many significant points noted. The biblical interest in miracle the author rightly attributes to the conviction of God's creative activity. No laws of nature impede the activity of an omnipotent God.

One cannot but feel, however, that the relevance of Parts I and II is really not clear. It looks as if the author had started out to deal with science in general, and had ended up by treating the issue of miracle. Of course the two are related, but the organization of the book does not present the topic of its title coherently. The two major parts, subtitled "Science" and "Christianity," do not balance each other, and indeed overlap. The title of the book supposes that the author would treat of miracle and natural law in ancient thought, subdividing it perhaps into Greco-Roman and Christian sections. Had he done this, he would have given himself more space to pursue the theme of his title.

This theme is an important one indeed, and a solid book on it is sorely needed. Dr. Grant has made a good beginning, but there is a great deal more that needs to be said on the question. On such important figures, for instance, as Origen and Augustine, a more thorough study is needed. Dr. Grant recognises that both these writers are not consistent in their viewpoint, but the reasons for these inconsistencies (especially in Origen) need further penetration. They have to do with the relation of the noetic to the phenomenal world, and involve the difficult question of history, which de Lubac has lately raised but which Dr. Grant does not sufficiently consider.

Then again, the differences between healing and other miracles need emphasis, in the light of the experience of the ancient world and of early Christianity. In this connection there comes to mind Origen's treatment of miracles as *ta mesa,* as well as his interesting notes on miracle healings in the Church, and his observations on the kind of people who effect them, their relation to asceticism, and so on. Once more, there is the important discussion of miracle in Eusebius' reply to Hierocles (on Apollonius and Christ), which Dr. Grant does not mention.

The author's own attitude toward the miraculous is hinted at throughout the book, and clearly emerges in his concluding section. He espouses Richard Kroner's view that "miracles can be verified or rejected by means of scientific thought as little as the laws of nature can be compre-

hended with the power of religious imagination; they occur and are meaningful in a sphere quite different from that of science and thought" (p. 268). Dr. Grant views miracle stories as symbols or pictures of God's freedom and power. Such a position is not entirely satisfactory, for it begs the real issue of the historicity of miracles. The Christian view of the significance of history makes this question fundamental. Miracles are events which have religious meaning of a particular kind, and while this religious meaning lies beyond the realm of scientific enquiry, the events themselves do not. The solution Dr. Grant proposes involves a dichotomy which is basically unbiblical.

The ancient view of miracle teaches us two things. First, that the Hellenistic age was all too uncritical toward the question of historicity. This point Dr. Grant has explored very well. But it also teaches us a second thing which needs consideration, that many of the experiences of the ancient world were different from our own. We often fail to appreciate how the heritage of the Enlightenment has closed off to us areas of experience familiar to the ancient and medieval world. It is only through the researches of parapsychology that we are gaining a new understanding of this; and it behooves us to take more seriously than we have been accustomed to unusual events which antiquity records. We understand this a little, perhaps, in the realm of religious healings. We need to appreciate it more in other realms. It will then become possible to read ancient literature in a new light. We shall see that the unusual event is often miraculous precisely because it is the medium through which religious meaning is disclosed. Its "otherness" speaks of the divine, although by being merely unusual an event is not necessarily a miracle.

The question of miracle in the ancient world cannot be fruitfully treated without taking into account the false limitations imposed upon us by so-called "science." This relies upon a pattern of experience which is that of the Enlightenment, not of antiquity. Despite their exaggerations and uncritical attitude, the ancients may sometimes be speaking about events which did occur, but which are so foreign to us that we fail to give them credence. That such events fall into definite structures of creation is surely true, and hence they are not necessarily more miraculous than any other events. Yet by their extraordinary and powerful character they are capable of disclosing religious meaning in a unique way. In any case, the historicity of the events cannot be

divorced from this religious meaning. If miracle stories are only symbols or pictures, we sever the bond which unites religion with history. Certainly not all recorded miracles happened, perhaps only a very limited number of them, yet we can only understand the concept of miracle when we appreciate how primary the question of historicity is.

These criticisms we have made of Dr. Grant's book must not be unduly stressed. What he has presented is of permanent value, and no one delving into the subject can afford to neglect his book. He has done a valuable piece of spade-work by providing many good things that might otherwise be overlooked, although he has not reaped the full benefit from them all. The time will come when a definitive book on this subject will be written—perhaps by Dr. Grant himself, and this beginning he has made will doubtless provide a sure foundation.

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Paracelsus: Selected Writings. Edited by JOLANDE JACOBI. (Bollingen Series XXVIII) New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1951. 347 pp. $4.50.

The Behmenists and The Philadelphians. A Contribution to the Study of English Mysticism in the 17th and 18th Centuries. By NILS THUNE. Uppsala: Almquist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1948. 229 pp.

Illumination on Jacob Boehme: The Work of Dionysius Andreas Freher. By CHARLES A. MUSES. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951. 201 pp. $3.50.

It certainly is one of the numerous merits of the Bollingen Series to have tried to bring to life the strange, radiant figure of the great Philippus Aureolus Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim or—to call him by his common latinized name—Paracelsus. St. Louis, Missouri, owns one of the finest collections of rare works of this powerful Swiss thinker and physician, but information in the English language on that towering personality of the early Baroque is as yet rather meager. Still I wonder whether Jolande Jacobi's selection from Paracelsus' writings and her introductory essay on his life and work can bring this enigmatic writer of the sixteenth century near enough to the understanding of thinking men of the twentieth. Even the praise which C. G. Jung gives

Dr. Jacobi's anthology and his attacks against Sudhoff can, unfortunately, not resolve my doubts—nor Dr. Jacobi's statement that Johannes Kepler was a contemporary of Paracelsus!

Dr. Jacobi deviates from Hans Kayser's opinion that the world of Paracelsus is "quite alien to our time and only rarely comes into contact with it." She believes that today Paracelsus "has a greater message for us than he had for our fathers" in 1924, the year Kayser's anthology appeared. But is it enough justification of her claim to say that we, like Paracelsus, live "in a time of great transition," and that we, like him, wish to "open our minds to praise of creature and Creator"? Haven't there been *only* times of transition since the days of Adam's expulsion from paradise and times of praise of creature and Creator as well? The years around 1924 have certainly been no less "on the way to a new reality" than those around 1942 and 1951, when the German and English editions of Dr. Jacobi's book were published. It seems therefore, at least to me, far more advisable strategy to bring Paracelsus nearer to us by making the *strangeness* of his profound nature attractive to us; and I would hold that this would be an opportunity to enrich oneself far more by the understanding of a rather alien intellectual appearance than by the exclusive interest in one who speaks the same language and is molded in entirely the same pattern as ourselves.

Closely connected with this point is another objection against Dr. Jacobi's approach to Paracelsus. She evidently regrets that he was anything but a "polished writer" and, therefore, characterizes the aim of her anthology as an attempt to reduce his thoughts "to the essentials," to their "general and timeless elements." But one may doubt whether this could be done without sacrificing "the sharpness and vigor of the Paracelsian language" as well as the full impact of his visions. Friedrich Gundolf, in his small work on Paracelsus (1927), certainly paid a far more adequate tribute to the physician's greatness by emphasizing the eccentricity and bizarreness of his language, the richness of the mass of his continually growing experiences and the lack of static elements in his thought. When the great physician of the sixteenth century lets his imagination run wild and speaks of the relations between the human pulse and the firmament, between human physiognomy and the stars, the connections between chiromancy and the knowledge of minerals, between the human breath and the winds, between fever and earthquakes, then he seems to me to gain far more in stature than when we have to

listen to the considerable number of truisms selected from his writings by Dr. Jacobi.

Finally, I think it especially inappropriate to evaluate Paracelsus' doctrine of God as highly as is done in this work. In the field of theosophy, Jacob Boehme evidently ranks infinitely higher than Paracelsus, who was his forerunner only in the philosophy of nature. For the manifold colorless passages from Paracelsus' theosophy the numerous illustrations reproduced by Dr. Jacobi from books and other artistic sources of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries give at least some compensation. Something of the atmosphere of these baroque illustrations is also preserved in the two other recent publications centering around the world of the shoemaker and great thinker, Jacob Boehme.

In detailed and careful research referring not only to printed material but also to unpublished manuscripts of the seventeenth century, Nils Thune's book, *The Behmenists and the Philadelphians,* makes lucidly alive the religious climate in England, Germany, Sweden, and Finland in which such Protestant sects as the Philadelphians, the Quakers, and the Pietists could rise. Here we meet primarily with the central figure of the Philadelphian Society, Jane Leade (or Lead, 1624-1704), the "widow of God," the *mulier apocalyptica* (the "woman clothed with the sun," according to the Book of Revelation), with her inspirer, John Pordage (1607-1681) and her successor, Richard Roach (about 1660-1730). But along with these principal exponents of the movement in England there emerge other colorful associates of the sect, the brothers Johan and Erik Eriksson in Stockholm, Johann Dittmar von Salzungen, the "inspector" of the Society in Germany, Johann Wilhelm Petersen and his wife, Johanna Eleonora, both authors of mystical writings, and the rather strange circle of German adherents of John Pordage around Eva von Buttlar who, with her friends Winter and Appenfeller, claimed to be the representatives of the triad, Joseph, Mary, and Jesus, and lived in "unlimited sexual intercourse" between the members of that circle, while another Philadelphian group around a Frau Wetzel emphasized no less the importance of the "fraternal kiss," in contrast to the English Philadelphians. Francis Lee, however, the son-in-law of Jane Lead and her collaborator, who, with Richard Roach, lived in her house and was nicknamed "Rabbi Lee," on account of his knowledge of Oriental literature, broke away from the Philadelphian Society, and thus led to

the dispersion of that group of English adherents of Boehme which, around 1694, had adopted the "hard name," Philadelphians, preaching brotherly love and teaching the principles of Boehmian theosophy in its monthly periodical *Theosophical Transactions* (Nos. 1-5, London, 1697).

Finally, such Quakers are brought into the picture as James Nayler, who in 1650 "allowed himself to be treated as the Messiah when entering Bristol enticed to this by some female adherents," "the Quaking Lord," the fifth Earl of Pembroke, Herbert Philip, who made the court of Charles II "merry" with his prophecy of the end of the world, and many other mystical personalities of minor importance. But John Pordage's polemics against these Quakers is hardly of greater value than his polemics against the Jewish cabala, in which he remains completely unaware of how much Jewish mysticism has in common with the theosophy of his master Boehme; and Dr. Thune rightly does not overemphasize the importance of his heros in any respect.

He admits that neither the English Behmenists John Pordage and his friend Thomas Bromley (1630-1691), nor any of the Philadelphians, including Jane Lead herself, can rival Jacob Boehme in the boldness and force of his mystical experience and language. How often must a modern reader feel that perhaps the most expressive part of the writings of these Boehme epigenes are certain titles of their books: Jane Lead's *The Heavenly Cloud Now Breaking* (1681), *The Enochian Walks with God* (1694), *The Wars of David, and the Peaceable Reign of Solomon* (1700), *A Living Funeral Testimony* (1702), Francis Lee's *Der Selig und aber Seeligen Jane Leade letzere Lebensstunden* (1705), Richard Roach's *The Imperial Standard of Messiah Triumphant* (1727), and others!

Dr. Thune also grants—after almost too assiduous a consultation of modern medical literature—that Mrs. Lead was a hysteric. But, at the same time, he certainly is no less justified in praising the true irenic spirit of this "prophetess" of the Philadelphia Society which led her to the utterance of such sincere and noble insights as this: "There are many angels of Judgment, but healing angels are few."

The name of the German Boehme interpreter, Dionysius Andreas Freher, who lived for a large part of his life in England, appears in Nils Thune's work only in passing. But even so, Thune ascribes to him—correctly, I presume—greater "philosophical and psychological depth"

than to Pordage. It is, therefore, most gratifying to see that this mystical author, who was born in Nürnberg in 1649, emigrated to England before 1699, died in London in 1728, and is as yet almost entirely unknown, has now been granted a full-fledged monograph by Dr. Charles A. Muses. The case of Freher is, lamentably, not the only one in the history of ideas which demonstrates that the most spirited of a group of writers may not be printed while his minor contemporaries are. But the Freher case is striking enough.

Freher left only unprinted manuscripts, many of them illustrated with symbolic figures by his closest associate, J. D. Leuchter. Their existence seems to have escaped even the attention of Franz von Baader, the most diligent and creative explorer of older Boehme literature in the nineteenth century. These numerous manuscripts are now preserved in English and American libraries, where I, unfortunately, have not been able to study them. But the detailed description devoted to them by Dr. Muses gives an impression of excellent accuracy, as does the biography of Freher and the depiction of his circle, for which the details had to be drawn from sources rather difficult to gather.

As to the evaluation of Freher's and Boehme's work, I fully agree with Dr. Muses that an ethics disregarding all the problems of evil, of Machiavellianism and power politics—unlike the ethical thought of Boehme and Freher—remains an "arid . . . and unrealistic . . . philosophizing," or to express a somewhat similar observation in the terms of Freher: The Manichaeans were not "such fools and monsters as they are still described." Furthermore, I think that it can hardly be mistaken to include Freher, as Dr. Muses does, among those thinkers of the eighteenth century who became aware of an "un-selfconscious phase" of our consciousness and profoundly realized that, to say it in his own words, we are "so very great strangers to our own created being." And yet, in Freher's context, this observation can hardly be named "analytic psychology" in the modern sense of the term.

Also Muses' attempts to show that William Law was far more decisively influenced by Freher, and Boehme less dependent on Weigel and Schwenkfeld than Stephen Hobhouse and Rufus M. Jones maintain, seem to me notable and valuable. And yet, to charge Hobhouse with a "demonstratedly conscious" neglect of Freher's merits—or even with "the bias of patriotism"—and Rufus Jones with conscious underevaluation of Boehme's originality, is doubtless an entirely unjustified

censure of these two Quaker scholars of outstanding integrity and international-mindedness.

Finally, I warmly agree with Dr. Muses that after "the physical sciences have long shared the freedom of world communion," there is no longer any excuse for "misguided provincialism" in philosophy which discards the thought of other nations, civilizations, and world epochs than those to which oneself belongs. Our author's way, however, of invoking the authorities of Laotse, Socrates, the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, symbolic logic, and especially his reference to Kant, the staunch opponent of any ethics of a "loving will," seems to me fairly questionable in the context of his argument.

Moreover, it is, in my opinion, a basic defect of Dr. Muses' whole trend of thought that he apparently identifies moral value with unselfishness and self-interest simply with vice, in contrast to Kant and most of the greatest ethicists of all times, including, in a certain sense, Boehme and perhaps even Freher. Muses obviously goes so far as to identify even ethical determinism with egoism and materialism. Such vagueness of thought, moreover, necessarily thwarts his far-reaching ambition to present Boehme and Freher as thinkers whose "message to mankind will become more practical and significant with each passing day of this critical century."

Dr. Muses himself is a mind sufficiently critical not to share the fantastic belief of the bibliophile Edward Fisher, who, in the beginning of the nineteenth century, felt certain that Napoleon would have liked to invade the British Isles only to get possession of Freher's manuscripts. Yet, when Dr. Muses presents Boehme's and Freher's theosophic speculations—not as a religious mythology of the greatest psychological and poetic profoundness—but as "historical" accounts, he no longer seems to me to make full use of his critical acumen.

Dr. Muses' analysis of the meaning of Boehme's seven properties (the *Naturen, Qualitäten,* or *Quellgeister)* and his discussion of the terms of "point, center and circumference" have definite merits. But how, with the best possible intentions, can these *zeitgebundenen* phantasies about the existence of only seven planets and similar timeworn ideas be made immediately fruitful for the ethics of our day, which equally needs far more penetrating conceptual analysis than Dr. Muses offers and, at the same time, a speculative imagination which can stand the test of present day critical knowledge?

All these critical remarks, however, should in no way detract from the specific merits of Dr. Muses' book. There seems to me no doubt that Freher's manuscripts deserve publication even two and a half centuries after their composition, and that no one is more entitled to carry out this meritorious work of an edition of Freher's writings than the first rediscoverer of Freher's importance as an independent thinker and Boehme interpreter.

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The Library of Congress

The Knowledge of God in Calvin's Theology. By EDWARD A. DOWEY, JR. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. viii, 261. $3.75.

This work, which was accepted as a thesis for the doctorate in theology by the University of Zürich, is a thoroughly competent piece of scholarship, and is even more. While it is based on a study of Calvin's works generally, and while its avowed subject is naturally much narrower than the whole theology of Calvin, it would form an admirable companion to the *Institutes,* helping a student to find his way in that great treatise, whose arrangement at first seems so involved and repetitive. But that is the least of the merits of Dr. Dowey's book: it is a volume which can give experienced theologians much to think about, and it has the great advantages of being both lucid and interesting.

The opening chapter gives the right perspective at the start in four well-conceived and original sections on four aspects of the knowledge of God as conceived by Calvin, viz., its "accommodated" character, its "correlative" character, its "existential" character, and its clarity and comprehensibility. The third of these headings will make the reader sit up and ask: "Is Calvin also among the existentialists?" Dr. Dowey's whole treatment is based on the recognition of the *duplex cognitio Domini* in Calvin, and he makes admirably clear what this double knowledge is: that the division is not between natural knowledge and revealed knowledge, but between the knowledge of God as Creator (which comes partly from nature and partly from revelation) and the knowledge of God as Redeemer (which would not have been necessary but for the Fall, and which is entirely by revelation). Having made this clear, Dr. Dowey goes on to two long chapters on these two divisions of

our knowledge of God. In the first of them, he is eminently successful in clarifying a complicated issue, and incidentally throws light on many things, including Calvin's conception of the authority and inspiration of the Bible. Both in this chapter and in an Appendix to the volume he touches on the famous controversy between Barth and Brunner about the legitimacy of a natural theology, a controversy in which both parties claimed to have Calvin on their side. According to Dr. Dowey, "neither side used Calvin's own basic distinction, the *duplex cognitio Domini*, properly", but further, Barth and his supporters misunderstood what Brunner was really saying, which was fundamentally true to Calvin. Dr. Dowey's own treatment makes Calvin's position as clear as possible, whether we agree with it or not: according to Calvin, something of God is revealed in His creation, but since the Fall it is only in Christ that we can truly see it. In that sense Calvin has no use for a "natural theology."

The long chapter on the knowledge of God as Redeemer, while never wandering from its own subject, takes us deep into several of the central ideas of Calvin's theology, in particular the nature of faith and its relation to the divine election. The final chapter, on the relation between the knowledge of God the Creator and the knowledge of God the Redeemer, includes a penetrating analysis of the place of the divine law in Calvin's scheme, and ends by showing how, when viewed from its Christological center, Calvin's theology is a theology of paradox, in which the two orders of knowledge have a dialectical relation to each other, "not a dialectic resolved within the thought system as in Hegel, but one of which the final unity lies in the transcendent God and is partially apprehended by faith, as in Kierkegaard."

Some readers may be tempted to accuse Dr. Dowey of unduly reading "existentialist" ideas into Calvin, and this is not the only point at which he interprets Calvin with the aid of concepts formulated long after his time. In dealing with the *sensus divinitatis*, the overwhelming apprehension of God's awfulness and majesty, in Calvin's thought, he speaks of the *mysterium tremendum*, and with reference to Rudolf Otto, says: "We are here in the area of the truly numinous in Calvin's theology," going on, however, to say that "Calvin does not speculatively isolate the numinous from the moral as Otto does." Dr. Dowey also, in expounding Calvin, uses Karl Heim's idea of an eternal "dimension" breaking through in conscience into our lives; and he uses Nygren's conception of *agapè* in exposition of Calvin's doctrine of the gratuitous

mercy of God. But in none of these cases can he fairly be accused of reading alien ideas into Calvin—even when he says that "Calvin's concept of religious knowledge belongs to those that can be classified as existential." It is rather a merit of this book that it reads Calvin with twentieth-century eyes and sees his relevance to the living questions of our contemporary thought, so that the volume is more than a piece of scholarly historical research. It is full of theological understanding. If any criticism is to be made of this excellent book, it is that Dr. Dowey, in his enthusiasm for Calvin, tends to give a *too* favorable interpretation of some of the less defensible elements in his theology, such as the double predestination doctrine. But it cannot be said that there is anything seriously misleading in his treatment. The book deserves high praise, and it is to be hoped that from the pen of this able author, who has shown himself so good an expositor of the great Reformer, we shall in days to come have original contributions to theological thought.

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Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England. By H. John McLachlan. Oxford: University Press, 1951. viii, 352 pp. $5.00.

Socinianism is here traced meticulously, both in its more general manifestation as theological rationalism, political toleration, and ecclesiastical latitudinarianism, and in the more restricted sense of specifically Socinian doctrines. The stream of Socinian works from Poland and Holland to English episcopal, university, and private libraries is carefully explored (with several appendices) all the way from the dedication of the first Latin edition of the Racovian Catechism to James I in 1609, through the Laudian canon of 1640 (restricting the possession and perusal of such works to the clerically qualified), through the Restoration, when Socinian books were sold and bought as openly as the Bible, up to 1697 and 1698. Certain events and developments during these two years clearly close off a distinct phase in the history of British Socinianism: the philanthropist subsidizer of the spate of English Socinian tracts, Thomas Firmin, died; *The Religion of Mr. Firmin* was published, as was also *The Agreement of the Unitarians with the Catholic Church,* which tapered off the Trinitarian Controversy within the Established Church; the last execution for heresy in Great Britain took place in

Scotland with the hanging of an eighteen year old student for denial of the Trinity; and the Blasphemy Act was passed expressly excluding Papists and Socinians from certain civil rights.

For the years 1609-1697/98 the tutor and librarian of Manchester College, Oxford, has so impressively documented the wide extent and the high seriousness of the Socinian, crpyto-Socinian, and anti-Socinian literature, imported and domestic, that he has considerably sharpened our focus on the intellectual history of the English seventeenth century. He has related but kept separate two lines of development.

Pointing out that Socinianism in its rationality and latitudinarianism appealed to many Arminian churchmen and moderate royalists in part because of its neutrality in politics and polity, the author pursues the Socinian spirit from the library of Lord Falkland in Great Tew and the learned conversations of the Oxford rationalists (William Chillingworth, John Hales), to the halls of the Cambridge "sect of latitude-men" (Benjamin Wichcote, Ralph Cudworth), to the studies of the scientist-theologians (Isaac Newton, John Locke). To these last the author has already devoted a full-length study.[1] All these men were part of a distinguishable current of adventuresome (for the most part lay) theological speculation, which though never admittedly Socinian even in Locke and Newton, nevertheless clearly drew inspiration from the Italian Reformer and his avowed followers whose works had found places on their study shelves. But the Unitarian tutor is laudably at pains not to press the affinity and to clear John Hales, for example, of the charge of doctrinal Socinianism laid against him in his own day, by skillfully withdrawing from his authorship two anonymous tracts upon which the charge had primarily rested.

The second current, articulate and often adventurously courageous Socinianism in doctrine and worship, espoused by clerics and gentlemen, constitutes the principal line of development and the bulk of the study. The treatment of avowed Socinians and Unitarians is exhaustive. Many new names, facts, and revised interpretations come before us. The author reconstructs the life of the first to publish an original Socinian work in English (1647), Paul Best, and points to the probable influence of this traveler to Poland and Transylvania and Socinian convert upon John Bidle, "the father of English Unitarianism," when the two were imprisoned in the Gatehouse, Westminster, pending separate hearings.

1. *The Religious Opinions of Milton, Locke and Newton* (1941).

It will be recalled that the "Draconic Ordinance" calling for the death penalty (1648) was passed largely because of the extraordinary publishing success of Best and Bidle while incarcerated. Up until Bidle published his *Confessions of Faith touching the Holy Trinity* (c. 1649), his thought had developed independently of, but more or less parallel to Socinianism. And he persisted in his own peculiar views of the (to be sure, subordinate) *personality* of the Holy Spirit and of the anthropomorphism of the Father ("with organized body and parts like man") even after he became conversant with Socinian literature. It is, indeed, the former peculiarity of his theology which identifies him almost certainly, McLachlan argues, as the translator-paraphraser of the daring English version of the Racovian Catechism (1653), one year after the new Latin edition had been seized and burned by order of Parliament.

McLachlan's full treatment of Bidle, which constitutes the heart of his study, is followed by a careful tracking down of all the activities of his friends and associates. This fresh exploration makes it possible for him to revise slightly the received opinion that organized, worshiping Socinianism-Unitarianism lapsed for a century until its rebirth in Theophilus Lindsey. There are accounts of John Cooper of Gloucestershire, where Bidle had once served as schoolmaster; of John Knowles, Henry Hedworth, and Thomas Firmin of London; and of Stephen Nye, the self-confessed Unitarian (Sabellian) rector of Little Hormstead, whom Firmin enlisted to compose *A Brief History of Unitarianism, commonly called Socinianism,* thereby setting off the Trinitarian Controversy in 1687.

Although the history of Socinianism in the century of fierce convictions and stern parliamentary and ecclesiastical repressions of changing heresies and polities must necessarily remain largely biographical, bibliographical, and episodical, nevertheless, the author has uncovered and related so many details that one turns from his pages impressed by the subtle pervasiveness of the Socinian spirit which gradually contributed to that shift of the formal principles of English Protestantism from King and Scripture in the sixteenth century, through Faith and Scripture in the seventeenth century, to Reason and Scripture—the Socinians' legacy to the eighteenth century when Christianity faced the threat of Deism.

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The Religious Foundations of Leveller Democracy. By D. B. Robertson. New York: King's Crown Press, 1951. viii, 175 pp. $2.75.

Since the publication of William Haller's *Rise of Puritanism* (1938) and his and Godfrey Davis' *The Leveller Tracts* (1944), sufficient material has been available to afford an understanding appraisal of the Levellers as radical political agitators who played an important role in the Puritan Revolution of the seventeenth century. Mr. Robertson has further explored their political doctrines in the pamphlet literature of their age and has related them to current religious doctrines which they shared with like-minded Puritan sectaries. Such a study is important and of special relevance today, because this group, which might accurately be called the lunatic fringe of English seventeenth century radicalism, can now be seen as pioneers in what has become respectable, conservative, political democratic thought.

The term "Leveller" was invented by enemies to discredit the movement but was retained, because, when properly defined, it was accurate enough. The leaders, John Lilburn, William Walwyn, Richard Overton, began, like John Milton, with an attack against episcopal tyranny, then against royal tyranny, and next against presbyterian tyranny. But they parted company with Milton and other Independents when they attacked the tyranny of Cromwell and his government for not going the whole way with their democratic revolution.

Their program for a new constitution for England which would insure the nation of justice, liberty, and peace, based on righteousness, was embodied in *The Agreement of the People.* In the preface the *Agreement* states: "We the free People of England . . . agree to abolish all Arbitrary Power, and to set bounds to our Supreme and all subordinate Authority, and remove all known Grievances." *The Final Agreement* stipulated that Parliament be disbanded in August 1649, a new Parliament be chosen by all men over twenty-one, save servants, paupers, and those who had served the king, members of Parliament to serve for one year. Parliament may not regulate religion, collect tithes, conscript troops, grant monopolies, tax food, hold prisoners without counsel, nor punish any person for refusing to answer questions which might incriminate him. No capital punishment save for murder "or for endeavoring by force to destroy this agreement."

The Levellers insisted that their democratic program was political

only and did not contemplate social or financial levelling. But most Englishmen who followed their arguments believed that, if the vote were extended to those who did not own property, there was no assurance that these voters would not take the property from those who owned it. As Ireton said of the Leveller *Agreement,* it "takes away that which is most original, the most fundamental civil constitution . . . that constitution by which I have property." Modern inheritors of Leveller radicalism have demonstrated that Ireson was right.

Mr. Robertson is in a sound position when he writes of the religious foundations of Leveller democracy. He is too cautious to assert the religious origins of this radical agitation. Certainly the Levellers supported their doctrines by the same religious rationalizations which enabled other sectaries to arrive at quite different doctrines. Like all sectaries they professed that they sought only to obey God's will, which is the supreme law. This law of God is revealed in the Scriptures and written in our hearts, and is understood and confirmed by right reason in each individual. All the Levellers gave varying degrees of lip service to the dogma of the Fall of Man and the resultant Original Sin. But with them the doctrine failed to instill an intelligent skepticism in regard to fallen man's reason. They were sanguine and optimistic, and certain that whatever seemed reasonable to them was God's will. As Robertson points out, "As is clear in the Leveller writings, the reason is conceived to be sufficiently intact so that the people could be trusted to lead to a right and just solution of any political problem." And elsewhere, "It is this 'wild and vast' notion of individual judgment which frightened Ireton and his fellow Independents at Putney, and the implications of this tenet finally turned Milton against democracy." But Milton shared their passionate individualism in religion, if not in politics, as well as their prejudice against an educated clergy and an institutionalized church.

Another religious movement of the seventeenth century gave encouragement to the sectaries, including the Levellers, in their belief that in their own time the new Jerusalem was building in England's green and pleasant land. This was the millenarianism based in part on scholarly studies of Revelation by such writers as Joseph (not William) Mead, but even more on literal reading of Daniel and Revelation by common men who were convinced that Christ's reign had already begun.

Robertson also points out that democratic self-government of "gath-

ered" churches had some influence on the development of Leveller ideas of political democracy; also, that "In the Levellers and Diggers, both sectarian, the Natural Law of equality is absolute." He feels quite sure that their notion of Natural Law is philosophical and theological, but in the absence of documentation he admits he is unable to demonstrate that they were aware of the theological implications. The Leveller propagandists used all the popular catchwords of sectarian religious controversy, but too often they did not think through the relationship between the concepts dealt with.

To give a complete or well-balanced report on Mr. Robertson's thesis in a few hundred words is as impossible as it was for Mr. Robertson, in 123 pages of discussion, to give a complete and lucid statement of the confused and frequently conflicting sectarian winds of religious doctrine which blew up, down, and crosswise during the Puritan Revolution. But read against the background of seventeenth century history of ecclesiastical and civil politics, which Mr. Robertson expects his reader to possess, his study has thrown a clear, cautious, and scholarly light. Students of the epoch owe him a real debt.

DONALD LEMEN CLARK

Columbia University

The Making of the Restoration Settlement. By ROBERT S. BOSHER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951. xvi, 309 pp. $5.00.

Academic theses in history may be expected either to advance knowledge of a special subject by adducing further recondite information, or to re-interpret a body of historical data by a significant revaluation. Dr. Bosher has fulfilled both requirements, and these are remarkable achievements, considering the phenomenal quantity of research that is being done in seventeenth century English history. Furthermore, he has the gift of interesting writing. Good wine needs no bush, but the prefatory commendation of Professor Norman Sykes makes us all the more eager to savor the bouquet of the wine of the Cambridge cellars, prepared by the delicate hands of this American scholar. In brief, Dr. Bosher has won his spurs as an ecclesiastical historian, and we may expect further studies from him in which the same wealth of documentation and careful interpretation will predominate.

The theme of his study is the influence of the Laudian or "High-

Church" party during the Cromwellian Interregnum as a preparation for the restoration of the Monarchy and the re-establishment of the Church of England. This subject is both novel and difficult, in that the Laudian influence had to be traced amongst exiles on the Continent and as an underground movement in England during the Commonwealth and Protectorate. Incidentally, this ecclesiastical "Resistance Movement" is traced with the verve and excitement of a mystery novel, but, of course, its use of imagination is more restrained than the comparison might suggest.

Dr. Bosher sees the Laudian party not (as customarily is the view of Anglican historians) as the crypto-Roman or extreme right wing of the Church of England, but as a true *via media* between Roman Catholicism and Puritanism, maintaining its allegiance to the monarchy. His thesis is twofold: (1) That the Laudians in Continental exile during the Interregnum served the cause of the re-establishment of the Church of England more than their customarily lauded brethren who remained in England, and (2) that their chief aim was to convert Edward Hyde (the future Clarendon and author of the anti-Nonconformist Code of that name known by the victims as "the five-stringed whip") to ecclesiastical intransigeance in refusing to include the Puritans within a more comprehensive Church of England.

The author makes good both these claims and thereby provides us with a new understanding of the forces operating both inside and outside England that were massing against Cromwell and his son and, in illuminating this gap in our knowledge, makes a definite contribution to the Restoration. The modesty, even hesitancy, with which he states his conclusions, the arrangement and interpretation of the evidence, the correlation of State documents and evidence derived from such private sources as letters and journals, are cumulatively most impressive.

Granted all these outstanding qualities, can the author survive the most stringent tests? That is, does he avoid the most common dangers of writing ecclesiastical history: partizanship and the aggrandization of the obscure? It is becoming less fashionable these days to pretend that objectivity and impartiality are easy or even possible of achievement. Enthusiasm for the subject itself is a bias. That, of course, the reviewer would count a necessary advantage, not a criticism. But he does consider it a defect of sympathy and of balance in the historian that he does not do justice to the opposition to the Laudians. There is no indica-

tion, for instance, that the Puritans were anything other than troublesome sectaries and revolutionaries. There is no suggestion that these men, in taming irresponsible monarchy, were the seedplot of English democracy; nor that both learning and conscience informed their liturgical concern and their desire to see the Church freed from the shackles of Erastianism. Bibliolaters, iconoclasts, and severe men, they undoubtedly were, but Dr. Bosher provides us with a caricature of them. His treatment of the Savoy Conference, where the great irenical Baxter and his Puritan moderates strove for comprehension with the Bishops in an enlarged Church of England is cynical, indeed as cynical as the pretended concern of the bishops to share the aims of the Puritans.

Moreover, in his eulogy of the re-establishment of the Church of England, it seems that he has forgotten that uniformity by legal enactment actually cost the Church the loss of many godly clergymen in that century and provided the intransigeant pattern which cost the Church of England the allegiance of the great Methodist revival of the succeeding century. Machiavellian statesmanship of this kind was shortsighted and it is curious to see it approved, or only mildly criticized, in the present century of ecumenical advance. The Laudians as well as the Puritans had motes in their eyes. Such partizanship and its consequences are a blemish on an otherwise admirable historical monograph. And, in fairness to Dr. Bosher, his own conscience protests (though a little late):

> In the stormy course of a century of struggle, noble ideals were too often corrupted by political intrigue, and heroism marred by intolerance and dissimulation . . . and if we would claim that the preservation of the Anglican heritage in its fulness was due to the work of the Laudian party, it must be with the conviction that the Lord who rules the destinies of the Church can turn even the wrath of man to his praise. (p. 283).

HORTON DAVIES

Rhodes University
Grahamstown, South Africa

Torchbearer of Freedom: The Influence of Richard Price on Eighteenth Century Thought. By CARL B. CONE. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1952. 209 pp. $3.75.

This is the second modern biography of Richard Price. Professor Cone's detailed examination of manuscript sources and his organization

of the materials in terms of Price's interests and influence makes of this work a more satisfactory biographical study and a better contribution to the cultural history of eighteenth century England than Roland Thomas' earlier book (*Richard Price, Philosopher and Apostle of Liberty*. Oxford, 1924). Cone's work does a great deal to make clear to the modern reader why Price's name is so often to be found with those of Franklin, Priestley, Gibbon, and Jefferson in lists of Anglo-American immortals made by his contemporaries. The range of Price's activities and friendships is well indicated, and his total readiness to give of himself to the utmost for the causes in which he believed.

Price's support of the American revolution endeared him most to an earlier generation of Americans, yet even in this role he has been forgotten by all except the scholars among the Americans. Many Americans of my generation studied in secondary school Edmund Burke's speech on Conciliation with the American Colonies, and somehow came away with the idea that Burke was the only public figure in England to have appreciated the revolutionary cause. All too few have come later to realize that Burke's was a counsel of expediency; his advice was given in the interests of England and English commerce. Price was not the only, but the most vocal spokesman for the American nation on the principled basis of support for the cause of human freedom. In his discussions of Price's speeches, pamphlets, and open letters on the American and French revolutions, Professor Cone's biography is particularly valuable.

Useful, too, is the detailed examination of the growth of Price's reputation as an actuarial statistician. Cone recognizes his limits in this field and does not exaggerate his claims for Price (as Roland Thomas did). In fact, Cone is rather biting in discussion of Price's deep, if somewhat misplaced, faith in the mysteries of compound interest. The career of Price as unofficial financial adviser to the ministries of Shelburne and the younger Pitt is well told and judiciously evaluated.

The weakness of Cone's presentation comes precisely at those points where readers of this *Journal* would appreciate better treatment. Cone is superficial in his discussions of the ethical and religious aspects of Price's life and thought. In the case of his ethics, the valuable treatment by Daiches Raphael, in his recent edition of Price's *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals,* provides the needed supplement. But there is need of a more sophisticated and more profound study of

Price's sermons and religious writings. The Arianism of his dissenting theology merits better handling than Cone gives it, especially in terms of his friendly differences of opinion with Priestley. Furthermore, one would like to know more of the theology of a man who spoke this moralistic sentence in a *Discourse on the Love of our Country* (1789):

> Set religion before them as a rational service, consisting not in any rights [*sic*] and ceremonies, but in worshipping God with a pure heart and practising righteousness from the fear of his displeasure and the apprehension of a future righteous judgment, and that gloomy and cruel superstition will be abolished which has hitherto gone under the name of religion, and to the support of which civil government has been perverted (quoted by Cone, p. 181).

Despite this weakness in dealing with the philosophic and religious aspects of Price's career, Professor Cone's book marks an advance in Price studies. It can be read with profit by any student of the eighteenth century climate of opinion.

J. L. Blau

Columbia University

Philosophy of Nature. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Translated from the French by Imelda C. Byrne; to which is added Maritain's Philosophy of the Sciences by Yves R. Simon. Pp. X and 196.

In this little book Maritain does not expound a philosophy of nature. Rather, he seeks to show that there can be such a thing, and that, indeed, there must be a philosophy of nature if the body of knowledge is to be complete. The philosophy of nature must avoid absorption in the experimental sciences, on the one hand, and must be kept distinct from metaphysics, on the other (pp. 1-4). This can be done by means of Thomism, by means at least of a modernized Thomism. One gathers that such a Thomism alone can provide the proper place for a philosophy of nature. Certainly Platonism cannot do it. For, Maritain urges, "all philosophy that begins in geometry, that blazons the Platonic emblem upon its door, will inevitably be tempted to conceive metaphysics after the type of mathematics, and set the objects of the metaphysician in a separate world." The result is that "there is not and there cannot be a philosophy of nature in a system like Plato's" (p. 7). In such a

system there are opinions concerning the sensible world and becoming, with eternal archetypes as the objects of metaphysics. There is, then, no scientific knowledge of the world of movement and time. The Platonic philosopher who tries to rise above opinion and to interpret this world can proceed only with the help of *myths*. "The use of myths to interpret sensible nature is really indispensable in Plato's philosophy. I think it can be generally said that every attempt to explain natural phenomena by the use of mathematical knowledge alone necessitates recourse to explanatory myths" (p. 7).

The Aristotelian doctrine is directed upon the intelligibility that is within things. In such a doctrine there is an object for a philosophy of nature—it is the ontological diversification of nature. There are, according to Aristotle and the scholastics, three degrees of abstraction which correspond to the degrees of immateriality or immaterialization of the object. In what Maritain describes as the orders of abstractive visualization, the lowest order is defined by abstraction from singular or individual matter. The philosophy of nature and the sciences are within this order. At the second degree, where mind abstracts from sensible matter, we have mathematics. But mind may abstract from all matter, and so arises metaphysics, whose object is being as being. It must be noted, however, that the second degree of abstractive visualization is not on the same line as the first (p. 27). This seems to mean that mathematics is not a middle stage between the philosophy of nature and the sciences on the one hand and metaphysics on the other. This second degree is concerned with a "wholly other universe of intelligibility" (p. 27). Mathematics has no intrinsic reference to the sensible, but rather to the directly or indirectly imaginable.

In these conditions, the problem for Maritain is to define the character of a (or the?) philosophy of nature as distinct from metaphysics, from mathematics, and finally from the experimental sciences. The error of the ancients must be avoided, for they tended to think of the philosophy of nature as absorbing all of the natural sciences. Likewise the error of the moderns must be avoided—the error of absorbing the philosophy of nature into the body of the natural sciences. Maritain devotes a lengthy section to the latter error, that is, to the posivistic conception of science.

Thus we are led to distinguish between two types of conceptual analysis: the ontological, directed toward intelligible being, and an empiriological or spatio-temporal analysis oriented toward the observable and

measurable as such (p. 75). The former analysis is directed toward mutable being in so far as it is mutable. The two analyses are mutually complementary (pp. 93 ff.). Metaphysics, however, has no need of such complementation; it dominates the sciences and is free of them (p. 97). Notions such as those of form and matter, body and soul, properly belong to the philosophy of nature, while potency and act, essence and existence, are metaphysical concepts. The distinction between the two orders of intelligibility is indicated by this, that some concepts—such as essence and existence—are relevant to purely immaterial beings, but others, such as form and matter, body and soul, are not. The latter cannot be conceived without reference to sense experience (pp. 86 f.).

The later portions of this book are curiously suggestive of the position taken at the beginning with respect to Platonism. The opinions of Platonism concerning sensible existence are seemingly replaced by the findings of the sciences, but these findings must be distinguished from the ontological analysis of the philosophy of nature, for otherwise the latter would not exist to complement the sciences. What has become of the Platonic need of myth? It seems clear that, according to Maritain, the philosophy of nature has no need of myth. One gathers it is otherwise with the sciences. The physico-mathematical sciences ". . . in their most highly conceptualized branches reconstruct their universe by means of myths or symbols which as such have no connection with the real causes dealt with by philosophers" (p. 152). The situation as left by Maritain is puzzling. In Platonism, one gathers, there can be no philosophy of nature, and this vacuum can be filled only by myth. In the Thomistic tradition there is a genuine philosophy of nature, dealing with real causes, complemented by and complementing physico-mathematical sciences, founded in the real, but constructing the universe by means of myths or symbols which as such have no connection with the real causes. If this be a fair statement, it leaves the relation of complementation in considerable obscurity.

Albert G. A. Balz

University of Virginia

BOOK NOTES

Buddhism: A Religion of Infinite Compassion. Edited by CLARENCE H. HAMILTON. New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1952. xxviii, 189 pp. Text edition. Paper cover, $1.75; cloth, $3.00.

This is the first of a series of volumes to be published eventually in the Library of Religion, a project sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and its Committee on the History of Religions; of which Professor Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University is chairman. Several other volumes are in preparation, dealing with Hellenistic Religions, Islam, The Ancient Near East, Ancient Roman Religions, Talmudic and Medieval Judism, and numerous others are expected to appear in good time. The general aim of the series is to make available to students the most essential texts of the various religions, living and dead, in good readable translations. All volumes will appear in paper and cloth editions, in order to bring them down to the price level where students may buy them freely. This is a most worthy enterprise and one that well deserves to succeed. I feel quite sure that teachers of the History of Religion will welcome them enthusiastically.

The volume under review here was edited by Clarence H. Hamilton, of Oberlin Graduate School of Theology, long time and diligent student of Buddhism. It is in the main a source book on the life of Buddha and Buddhism with selections drawn from a wide range of original writings from the various schools. The edition provides also a valuable introduction, notes where needed, a Buddhist Chronology, a discussion of Buddhist literature, and a very useful glossary of Buddhist terms. The volume is divided into five parts. Parts one and two deal with the life of Buddha and his early teachings, drawn from Pāli Buddhist literature. Part three is from Sanskrit and Chinese texts; part four from the Japanese and part five from Tibetan sources. Thus there is a good coverage of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna sources.

Since the series in general is aimed at the beginner, rather than the advanced student in Buddhism who has accessible complete translations of the most important texts, Editor Hamilton has properly given comparatively little material bearing upon the more philosophic aspects of Buddhism. He includes only brief excerpts each from Vasubandhu and Nāgārjuna, but gives ample references as to where such material may be found. From the Mahāyāna only the more widely used and loved scriptures are included. From Japan selections representative of four sects are included, the Jodo, Shin, Zen, and Nichiren, while from Tibet there are stories of the famous Prince Viśvaṇtara, and selections from proverbial wisdom.

I like the book very much. It strikes me as more usable than any of the collections with which I am acquainted. Easy identification of passages by footnotes immediately on the page where the passage begins is a good feature. I have always been annoyed by anthologies in which the identity of a passage can only be ascertained, if at all, by turning to an appendix at the end of the book and deciphering some cryptic symbols by which the author has obscured the names

of the sources. The material is well chosen, so that a student might, without the help of a general text description of Buddha and Buddhism, get a very good idea of the Buddha and his developed faith. It might even be an advantage to let him get it that way, then turn to other helps to confirm or correct his conclusions.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

Buddhism. Vol. II: *Mahāyāna*. By C. H. S. WARD. London: The Epworth Press, 1952. 222 pp. 15s.

The revised edition of Mr. Ward's volume on Hīnayāna Buddhism was published by the Epworth Press in 1947, and this complementary volume on Mahāyāna, promised then, has after many delays appeared. It is a refreshing experience to come upon this sane, clear, concise exposition after wading through the clotted nonsense served up to us in some of the recent books on Buddhism. Mr. Ward has had long experience of living amongst Buddhists in Ceylon, and though his closer acquaintance has been with Hīnayāna Buddhism, he has succeeded in this volume in giving an admirably clear and readable account of the growth and spread of Mahāyāna, its great teachers and great books, its numerous Schools of interpretation, its doctrine of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, together with a brief comparison of its main teachings with those of Hīnayāna. It is meant as an introductory book, and it would be difficult to find one better adapted to introduce students who are making their first acquaintance with the subject to the teaching of the Buddha and the systems which have developed from that teaching.

A. J.

The Book of Idols. A translation from the Arabic of the Kitāb al-Aṣnām by Hishām ibn al-Kalbī, with Introduction and Notes by NABIH AMIN FARIS. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. xiii, 59 pp. $2.50.

When, just before the First World War, the Egyptian savant Aḥmad Zakī Pasha announced that he had discovered a MS of the famous *Book of Idols* by the Muslim antiquarian and polyglot Ibn al-Kalbī (d. 822 A.D.), there was considerable excitement throughout the little world of Arabic scholarship. Muḥammad had declared that his new religion of Islam did away with all that preceded it, and orthodox Muslim writers for the most part said as little as possible about "the days of Ignorance" and the pagan religion of their Arab forebears. Consequently the information we have in Arabic texts about the idols, shrines, festivals, and cult practices of the pagan Arabs is tantalizing in its fragmentariness and its obscurity. There had been, however, some not-so-orthodox Muslims in earlier days who had written about pre-Islamic Arabia, among them Ibn al-Kalbī, from whose writings odd bits of information are quoted by a number of later writers, and here was an announcement of the recovery of his

famous *Book of Idols*. When it appeared in its first edition in 1914, however, there was great disappointment. It contained practically nothing beyond the scraps of information already available in other sources, and there were not lacking those who suggested that this was no genuine MS of Ibn al-Kalbī, but merely the work of some compiler who had gathered from Yāqūt, the *Aghānī*, and such sources, what was quoted there from, or might possibly be from Ibn al-Kalbī, and had put it together to make a book. However, it does assemble in a convenient form many of the surviving scraps of information that circulated in the early years of Islam about the old religion, and so it was translated (partially) into French by M. S. Marmardji in 1926, and more recently (1941) into German. This new volume in the Princeton Oriental Series presents it in English, with brief notes identifying as far as possible persons and places, and references to other sources where the material may be found.

A. J.

Ahmadiyyat or the True Islam. By Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad. Third edition. Washington: American Fazil Mosque, 1951. viii, 246 pp. $4.50.

This is in a way an official statement of the teachings of the Ahmadiyya sect of Islam, for it is written by the present head of the sect, the second successor of that Ghulam Ahmad who claimed to be the Promised Messiah, and from whom the sect takes it name, and it grew out of a paper read by the present head at a conference in London in 1924 on Living Religions within the Empire. It begins with an account of the origin and development of the Ahmadiyya Movement and some general remarks on religion, then discusses the peculiar Ahmadiyya interpretation of Islam under four heads: (1) the conception of God; (2) morals; (3) social aspects of Islam; (4) life after death, followed by an epilogue on the effects of the Promised Messiah's teachings on his followers. This edition is issued from the Ahmadiyya mosque at Washington, D. C.

A. J.

Aristeas to Philocrates (Letter of Aristeas). Edited and translated by Moses Hadas. Published for The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1951. vii, 733 pp. $4.00.

This able edition and translation of *Aristeas to Philocrates*, known inaccurately but commonly as the Letter of Aristeas, is the second volume in what is planned as a series of new editions of Jewish Apocryphal literature. Professor Solomon Zeitlin of the Dropsie College is chief editor for the series; Moses Hadas, whose work is before us, is also the secretary of the editorial board. The project is a worthy one of which reviewer hopes will be completed.

Aristeas purports to give a contemporary account of the translation of the Pentateuch into Greek at the behest of Ptolemy Philadelphus, who reigned

from 285 to 247 B.C.E. Its presumptive author is supposedly a Greek himself, a pagan, and an official of Ptolemy's court. Professor Hadas' "Introduction" marshals irrefutable evidence (a) that *Aristeas* was not an account written at the time of the events narrated; (b) that the author of *Aristeas* was not a pagan, or a Greek, but was, rather, an Alexandrian Jew; and (c) that the literary genre of *Aristeas* is that of the Greek romances. In addition, Hadas assigns with much justification 130 B.C.E. as the hypothetical date for the composition of *Aristeas*.

The translation is, as we have come to expect from Hadas, faithful, polished, and literary. A printing of the Greek text from H. St. John Thackeray's revised text parallels the English translation. Footnotes suggest variorum readings and add much from the editor's detailed study of *Aristeas* and of Greek literature in general, and from his broad knowledge of many other areas. Altogether, this is a highly successful production, that will, one hopes, be inspiring to other actual or potential students of Apocryphal literature.

J. L. B.

Moses Maimonides' Epistle to Yemen. Edited by ABRAHAM S. HALKIN, with an English translation by BOAZ COHEN. New York: The American Academy for Jewish Research, 1952. xxxvi, 111, xx pp. $3.75.

In this critical edition, Professor Halkin has carefully edited the Arabic original and three Hebrew versions of the Epistle to Yemen of Moses Maimonides (written about 1172). The Epistle in its present form is probably made up of several shorter replies to inquiries addressed to Maimonides by the head of the Yemenite Jewish community. The necessity for these inquiries arose out of a series of incidents and a major crisis in the life of this semi-isolated Jewish group. The major crisis was an attempt started about 1165 to force the conversion of the Jews to Islam; minor incidents included pressure from those who yielded to the enforced conversion and an indigenous Messianic movement. Much of the reply of Maimonides is concerned, therefore, with polemic against Islam, designed to provide aid to the Yemenite Jews in resisting the pressure to convert, and with a sober discussion of the Messianic concept in Judaism warning against too ready acceptance of the claims of self-declared Messiahs. The Epistle includes also a parenthetical rebuke of the Yemenite leader for a too credulous attitude toward astrology.

A good English translation of the Epistle by Rabbi Boaz Cohen, originally prepared some years ago and later revised for inclusion in this volume, adds to the value of the work. There is also an English introduction, brief and cursory, and a much fuller Hebrew introduction, in which the views expressed by Maimonides are examined in detail. Altogether this edition should rank as definitive until and unless new manuscript finds indicate radical divergencies from this well prepared text.

J. L. B.

Gospel and Law: The Relation of Faith and Ethics in Early Christianity. By C. H. Dodd. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. 83 pp. $1.50.

C. H. Dodd's Bampton Lectures, delivered at Columbia University, are a contribution to the perennial and perennially important debate on the place of ethics in Christian theology. Professor Dodd treats the issue exclusively as a problem in New Testament interpretation. He shows that the ethical teachings of the Gospels *(didaché)* are set within a narrative which proclaims that salvation has been provided in history by God *(kerygma)*. The same occurs in the Epistles, where the ethical precepts stand in the context of a theological elaboration of the same narrative. In the latter case, the form shows the precepts as part of a *catachesis* for instructing new converts. They are based on Jesus' teachings, but also belong to "the general movement in Graeco-Roman society towards the improvement of public morals." They are, however, distinguished from other such efforts by their kerygmatic setting, and this, spelled out, means their setting in Christian eschatology, in the view that believers belong to the "body of Christ," the appeal to imitate Christ, and in the God-given character of *agapé*.

After an instructive chapter on Jesus' ethical pronouncements, Professor Dodd affirms two roles that these teachings play. They "help toward an intelligent and realistic act of repentance," and they "offer positive moral guidance for action to those who have, in the words of the Gospels, received the Kingdom of God." All theologians agree on the former, but fear of a new law and a new legalism has led many (the author mentions Luther) to reject the second. Dodd regards this as a misunderstanding of Paul's antipathy to law. He affirms strongly that the "law of Christ" continues to lay on the believer the obligation of the new covenant without denying the kind of freedom from the law's "letter" that Paul taught. In the law of Christ, ethical activity is no longer conformity to an ethical code, but goes on within, its quality and direction determined by God's *agapé*. Since it is the *agapé* of God, Creator as well as Redeemer, this new law is significant not only for the Christian, but causes the believer to make moral judgments on human conduct in general.

This book is probably neither detailed nor argumentative enough to convince the opponents of Dodd's view, but it expounds in a masterly way, within the compass of four short lectures, all the main issues of the author's thesis. And this thesis must be dealt with in every Christian theology.

Edward A. Dowey, Jr.

Christian Egypt: Church and People. Christianity and Nationalism in the Patriarchate of Alexandria. By Edward Rochie Hardy. New York: 1952. Oxford University Press, x, 241 pp. $3.50.

The six chapters of this book were delivered originally as the Paddock Lectures for 1950 at the General Theological Seminary in New York. It was a commendable idea to make use of that opportunity to call attention once

again to one of the older Christian Churches whose long tumultuous history and whose contributions to Christian life and learning we are too apt to forget. It was somewhat of a disappointment, however, to find that five out of the six lectures are devoted to the relatively well-known Greco-Roman period, which is covered to some extent in most church histories, with only some very scrappy information in the last chapter on the long and exceedingly interesting period when the Copts were under Muslim domination, and on the modern awakening. These are the two periods on which we need to have fresh work done. The author is most at home in the period of the great controversies when the Coptic Church was developing into its Monophysite position, and has slipped over far too easily the problems of the early Gnostic form of Christianity at Alexandria. The newly discovered Gnostic papyri ought to throw a good deal of fresh light on this. It is interesting to see in this book how the evidence of the Greek papyri can be used. The little work that the present reviewer did with Adolf Grohmann on the Arabic papyri showed that they contain an abundance of information that could be used for the story of Christianity under Muslim rule.

A. J.

The Theodosian Code and Novels and the Sirmondian Constitutions. A Translation with Commentary, Glossary, and Bibliography. By CLYDE PHARR in collaboration with THERESA SHERRER DAVIDSON and MARY BROWN PHARR. With an Introduction by C. Dickerman Williams. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1952. xxvi, 643 pp. $20.00.

This is the first translation ever made of the Theodosian Code, and it is safe to assume that its contents are well known to very few scholars. The Code and Novels were produced during the first century and a half of the Christian Empire, and had an important part in the creation of the Christian society of later centuries. This carefully prepared English edition is sure to stimulate church history workers and others who are interested in this interaction between Christianity and society. Innumerable passages of the work either reflect the influence of Christian ideas or bear upon the functioning of Christian institutions. In the Introduction C. Dickerman Williams views persecution as having arisen from "the implacable hostility of the early Christians toward the state"—a generalization that would be hard to document. After Constantine, however, "the Emperors regarded the Church as a major bulwark."

The latter statement is assuredly well borne out by the numerous provisions vesting authority in bishops. These begin as early as 318, and include such sweeping statements as that the bishop's judgment in law shall be valid for all who consent to it (p. 408). Such determinations opened the door to a large development of clerical, at the expense of civil, courts of law. The Sirmondian Constitutions, so called from their seventeenth century discoverer, Jacques Sirmond, contain numerous imperial ordinances favorable to episcopal autho-

rity and ecclesiastical privileges. Thus a document of 333 states that "the testimony given by a bishop, even if he be the only witness, shall be unhesitatingly accepted by every judge," and Honorius and Theodosius, in 411, exempt the churches and their lands from taxation for roads, bridges, and other public services. Bishops are not to be tried in secular courts (p. 384). In time of public stress, however, Valentinian abolished certain privileges "acquired in the name of venerable religion" (p. 441). Disciplinary regulations for clerics also are given the sanction of public law. Clerics are by "imperial oracle" forbidden to "consort with extraneous women." This is not intended as a requirement of clerical celibacy; those who become clerics after marriage may not desert their wives: "For those women who have made their husbands worthy of the priesthood by their association are not unsuitably joined to clerics" (p. 420). Many of the laws are familiar by quotation in the large historical works, but students will now for the first time have available the whole body of Christian Roman law to A.D. 468 in a form that facilitates its fullest use.

J. T. M.

The White Canons in England. By H. M. Colvin. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1951; New York: Oxford University Press, 1952. viii, 459 pp. $7.00.

This work is not a history of the Premonstratensian Order in England, but rather a series of essays upon that topic. It opens with a brief chapter on the origin and development of the Order. There then follows a long section (about half the text) devoted to the establishment of the thirty-three English houses of white canons. This portion of the book may safely be called definitive; the author is the recognized authority in this field, his researches into the printed and manuscript sources have been exhaustive, and the account of each house is meticulously detailed and thorough. Much new information is provided, and the datings of several foundations are substantially improved. But, save for some provocative remarks on the relation of the feudal classes to monastic expansion (pp. 27-39), the very thoroughness of the treatment makes for rather dull reading; its unquestioned value will be as a work of reference.

After this extraordinarily detailed treatment of the beginnings of each house, Mr. Colvin's work becomes more selective. He discusses the connection of the English canons with the mother-house in France, their organization in England and electoral procedures, their relations with secular benefactors, their administration of parish churches, and concludes with two somewhat thin chapters on their intellectual activities (which do not appear to have been very extensive) and on the English Premonstratensian nunneries (only three in number, and quite undistinguished). The text is followed by nine appendices, running to almost a hundred pages and including several hitherto unpublished documents, a list of major corrections to Cardinal Gasquet's *Collectanea Anglo-Premonstratensia,* lists of the known abbots of each house, several specialized notes, and an excellent bibliography.

It will be readily apparent that the author leaves many aspects of English Premonstratensian history untouched. There is no discussion of monastic finance or of monastic discipline, though a good deal of incidental information on both topics is included. The Black Death, with its much debated effects upon monasticism, escapes mention. The Dissolution attracts only passing comment. But what Mr. Colvin elects to treat is presented with superlative excellence. He writes to prove no thesis and displays a consistent urbanity and lack of dogmatism. His materials tend towards a picture of late medieval monasticism strongly suggestive of that of the late G. G. Coulton, but one will find here no stated conclusions, much less moral judgments; the author would seem to be quite unconcerned by the implications of his findings for present religious controversies. By way of illustration, the reader may compare his remarks on Bishop Redman's visitations (pp. 224-27 and see index) with those of Coulton (*Five Centuries of Religion,* IV, 617-26).

It is precisely when Mr. Colvin becomes selective in his treatment, in the second half of his text, that his book becomes interesting reading. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters will hold the attention of many readers not primarily concerned with monastic history, for the author can write extremely well, and his conclusions—usually implicit rather than explicit—are weighted by his complete mastery of the sources. Notable is his discussion of the rights of founders, and of later medieval monastic advowson—by far the best treatment of these rather thorny problems the present reviewer has encountered. Few students of religious institutions will read this book without profit and pleasure.

RICHARD W. EMERY

The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages. By BERYL SMALLEY. Second Edition. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. xxii, 406 pp. $7.50.

This second edition, revised and enlarged, was well worth publishing. Since the first edition in 1941 the author has continued her intensive study. New material has brought the book from 311 to the present total of 428 pages. The bibliography has been brought up to date, and newly found medieval manuscripts used. For example, the new section in Chapter IV on Herbert of Bosham builds upon an important newly discovered manuscript. Areas of study, such as the work of the friars in the thirteenth century, which were inadequately covered in the first edition, receive more attention.

After a chapter on the early Church Fathers (with attention to Philo also), the book follows the study of the Bible from the eighth century to about A. D. 1300. It concentrates on the Bible in Latin, essentially in the region of northwest Europe. Because "the Bible was the most studied book of the Middle Ages," and its study influences or reflects all trends of life and scholarship in that period, the author follows the social and cultural changes and the development of religious institutions, such as the religious orders and the schools, which

were the homes of Bible study. She follows trends in linguistic study and philosophy, especially the influence of Aristotle in the latter part of the period. A notable feature of the picture sketched is the extensive recourse of medieval scholars to Jewish authorities to throw light on Jewish customs and Old Testament language and interpretation.

The book traces the ebb and flow of the struggle to vindicate the literal sense of Scripture against the persistent and powerful trend to allegory and mysticism. Interesting features are the great importance of Andrew of St. Victor in championing the literal sense, and the way Aristotelian thought helped keep the literal meaning from neglect.

The author explains the considerable influence of Jewish scholars and Hebrew, and the relative neglect of Greek, by saying that the medieval Christian mind found the Hebrew thought world more congenial, that Jewish help was present in northwest Europe while Greek scholars were not, and that theologians tended to take over the New Testament, where Paul's letters took the center of interest.

There are gaps in the volume, as the writer clearly states, but it is a work of basic and permanent importance for study of the Middle Ages as well as for the history of biblical interpretation.

FLOYD V. FILSON

Nattvardsberedelsen i reformationstidens svenska kyrkoliv. Skriftermål och fasta (Preparation for Communion in the Swedish Ecclesiastical Life of the Reformation Period. Confession and Fasting). By ÅKE ANDRÉN. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1952. liii, 350 pp. Kr. 24.

This work is the twenty-seventh and latest in a scholarly series entitled Collections and Studies in Swedish Ecclesiastical History. Bibliography and footnotes indicate that the author has delved deeply into a large number of printed and unprinted sources in order to make an exhaustive study of the field. The volume ends with a brief summary in German.

The author seeks to show how the communicant prepared himself for the sacrament by making confession and receiving absolution as well as by fasting. The confession might be public or private and, in the latter case, voluntary or obligatory. Fasting might likewise be either compulsory or voluntary. It might be satisfied by temperance, or it might be the Lenten form, consisting mainly in abstaining from meat, or it might mean absolute abstinence from all food or drink. Questions of liturgy were involved. Where does the confession of sins belong in the ritual? Does not the sacrament itself bring forgiveness of all sins? When should the communion service be held? Such were some of the questions, and answers and practices varied from time to time. If a complete fast must precede the sacrament, and it was generally agreed that mere abstinence from meat is no real fast, then the communion service should be celebrated very early in the day.

The early reformers taught, with Luther, that the sinner needed to confess his sins only to God and to the particular mortal whom he might have wronged. To ease his conscience, he might also confess to a third party, not necessarily to a priest but to any good Christian soul. Fasting was optional and should be of the spirit rather than the flesh. The Christian should be temperate in all things and not love any earthly thing, including food and drink, too well.

Although transubstantiation was denied, it was agreed that the communicant in some manner really partakes of the true body and blood of Christ. If he does so unworthily, he brings down judgment upon himself. The officiating clergyman must have the right to exclude those who are obviously living in open sin and unrepentant. In spite of Luther's emphasis on the universal priesthood of all believers, "orthodox" Swedish Lutheranism, before the close of this period, was stressing the importance of the ordained clergyman. Only he could administer sacraments and hear confessions.

How big a proportion of the congregation shared in the average communion service and how often did the average Swede go to communion? This frequency has certainly varied from time to time. Many today commune only once in their lives, on the occasion when they are confirmed. On that interesting question the study throws little or no light.

CONRAD PETERSON

Från hustavlans tid. By HILDING PLEIJEL. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses, 1951. 206 pp. Kr. 9:50.

This delightful collection of "folklife studies" by one of Sweden's foremost historians is a perfect example of Pleijel's warm, human approach to church history. He is perfectly aware of the fact that a religious development must be understood in its complete context—political, social, economic, and cultural —in short, as part of a total "pattern of culture," to use Ruth Benedict's phrase. Also, and equally important, the religious changes of an epoch can be understood only in relation to the preceding period, and the radical changes in Swedish ecclesiastical folklife of the last hundred years are merely a process of liberation from the social viewpoint of the *hustavlans tid,* a term which requires some explanation. According to Pleijel, the religious life of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Sweden was dominated by the "table of domestic duties" appended to Luther's *Little Catechism,* consisting of twelve short excerpts from the Bible setting forth the duties of the three social orders, clergy, civil authorities, and families. These three orders are ordained by God, with their mutual duties and rights with regard to each other, a doctrine which became the very warp on which the pattern of culture was woven. It is against this background of ingrained belief in the divine right of class distinctions and of hierarchies of authority within the three groups that the triumph of social democracy and individualism must be appreciated as a genuine, though peaceful, revolution.

Perhaps the most interesting section of the book is a sociological-historical study of a rural parish in Småland, from the coming of Catholic Christianity, through the Reformation, and to the end of the nineteenth century. The religious life of the community is graphically described under various headings, such as sabbath observance, holidays, baptism, marriage, burial, church discipline, religious education, the old Lutheran piety, and the Bible as a "folk book." For an understanding of the deep roots of Swedish Lutheranism and its interpenetration of the entire social structure of Swedish folk life, this little book is most illuminating.

M. B.

Saint Tikhon Zadonsky, Inspirer of Dostoevsky. By NADEJDA GORODETZKY. London: S.P.C.K., 1951. xii, 249 pp. 21*s*.

This is a scholarly but somewhat uninspired study of St. Tikhon Zadonsky, a celebrated Russian bishop and saint of the eighteenth century, whom Dostoevsky used as his model for Father Zosima in the *Brothers Karamazov*. His life was relatively uneventful, for after six years as bishop he retired to a monastery and spent the last fifteen years of his life as a simple monk and religious teacher, acting as spiritual adviser to large numbers of people and writing an important series of devotional works. He was one of the men of the eighteenth century who worked for a deepening of the spiritual life in Russia and was the most important of the clergy of the eighteenth century who combined Orthodox piety with the Petrine reforms. The volume is a mine of information, and not the least valuable part are the notes which briefly summarize the careers of many of the Russian Orthodox leaders of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The work is especially useful because it introduces the English reader to a section of Russian Church life frequently passed over in silence or neglected for the more daring hypotheses of Bulgakov, Berdyayev, and other twentieth century thinkers.

C. A. M.

Heavens on Earth: Utopian Communities in America, 1680-1880. By MARK HOLLOWAY. New York: Library Publishers, 1951. 240 pp. $4.75.

This attractive survey of some typical utopian communities in America makes no original contribution to our knowledge of these adventures in actualizing human ideals. It is a re-telling of oft-told stories, explicitly based on earlier accounts. Although Mr. Holloway's book is derivative, it has two justifications. The first is that the stories are well and interestingly told. The second is that, as is well-known, most of the nineteenth century communities were founded under religious-socialist auspices, whereas earlier communities were established

on purely religious foundations. Mr. Holloway claims a greater measure of success for the purely religious communities than for the religious-socialist communities, and utter failure for the secular-socialist communities. Thus this book is, in effect, ammunition for the cold war.

J. L. B.

The Life and Times of Daniel Lindley (1801-80). By EDWIN W. SMITH. New York: Library Publishers, 1952. xxx, 456 pp. $5.50.

A foremost British missionary, notable linguist, and former President of the Royal Anthropological Institute, adds to several distinguished books on Africa a first-class biography of remarkably wide interest. Daniel Lindley, product of American frontier religion and culture, a Presbyterian working with the Congregationalists of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, labored in South Africa from 1835 to 1873. Unintentionally involved in the Great Trek, and temporarily checked in his mission to the blacks, he became the first minister and the foster-founder of the Dutch Reformed Church in the entire area of Natal, Orange Free State, and Transvaal. For several years the Boers of this region looked to him, chosen and paid by the *Volksraad* of the Republic, as their one pastor, toiling annually by oxcart to every major district. President Krueger was among the leaders baptized or confirmed by Lindley.

But this exacting effort was only the preface to his longer service among the Zulus and the Matabele, who now became accessible in larger numbers. Lindley was a fine instance of the pioneering missionary. Amid dangerous and distressful conditions, year by year, he lived out faith, courage, endurance, sympathy. Saved from romanticism by clear-eyed comprehension of the violence, ignorance, and poverty about him, perhaps also by a realistic concept of human nature stated in the formulas of moderate Calvinism, he did not lose sight of the majestic potentialities of the simpler children of God. Throughout his life opposed to slavery, Lindley nevertheless learned much from his origins on the Indian frontier and from his cherished experience in the churches of the Southern States, and was able to understand the relentless pressure of the Boers to secure both the land and the labor of the blacks.

In the work of his own mission, Lindley recognized the necessity for beginning with religious and organizational paternalism. Yet he had both the vision and the actualizing will to advance from it by pushing responsibility upon selected converts, trained but hesitant. Lindley and his wife made their repeated and laborious building enterprises, their gardening, their kitchen, and their own fine family of eleven children, brought without a loss to wholesome maturity, into educational groups which supplemented formal church and school in the training of blacks at every age and in both sexes. The doctrines of teachers' colleges have almost reached the Lindleys' practice.

Smith's biography presents splendidly concrete data for the problems of acculturation, felt in religious and in plain human terms. Readers will find

special interest in the struggles of Boer, Briton, and black for the means of life, pathetically contemporary as 1952 is foreshadowed by a hundred years; also in *ad hoc* relationships of church and state, equally shocking to doctrinaire separatists and to purists of Reformed or Anglican breed; and again in the pain of the older daughters, returning to college in America, at the degradation through slavery of the race they had known walking "proud and free." This book informs, and with fascination.

M. Searle Bates

The Oxford Group: Its History and Significance. By Walter Houston Clark. New York: Bookman Associates, Inc., 1951, 268 pp. $3.50.

The author of this book is a professor of psychology and education at Middlebury College. The book is his Ph.D. dissertation, "The Oxford Group: Its Work in American Colleges and its Effects on Participants" (Harvard 1944), rewritten for a wider public.

The first part of the book tells the story of the Oxford Group from Buchman's ancestors through the gaudy days of Moral Re-Armament. The significant chapters of this historical sketch are those which deal with the Group's work in American colleges. Here Dr. Clark presents fresh and objective data throwing valuable light on the Group's formative period.

An interesting analysis of Buchman the man is presented in part two. His advertising ability, political acumen, Napoleonic ambition, and naïve theology are discussed along with his uncanny "intuitive sense for the inwardness of people" and his complete dedication to what he regards as God's "Guidance." The ideological roots of the movement are traced by the author to the German Pietism of Philipp Jakob Spener, and to Buchman's teachers, Henry B. Wright and Henry Drummond.

The third and largest section of the book presents a series of case histories showing how individuals were affected by the group. The cases were gathered by means of a brief questionnaire (appended to the book). They show the reactions of fifty-five participants as they view their experience in retrospect. The reactions range from hostilely negative to warmly positive.

The case material has value in showing how people, most of whom are no longer active in the movement, feel about their own experiences. There are, however, several questions raised by the author's use of the cases. The information derived from the questionnaire seems too limited in scope to warrant the interpretations given. The total sampling is small, and it seems doubtful that the cases are in any sense a representative cross section of Groupers (e.g., 34 of the 55 are clergymen). In the light of these limitations, it would seem very difficult to do what the author attempts to do in the last section, namely, to assay the significance of the entire movement on the basis of the data available. The more basic methodological question is whether or not the inner effects on participants or the fundamental significance of the Group can be ascertained by

the use of questionnaires. The closing section does give an interesting analysis of the appeal of the Group in terms of the spiritual hungers of our day.

In general, this book makes a worth-while contribution by presenting both favorable and unfavorable aspects of the Group's influence, thus escaping the extreme partisanship with which the movement has usually been surrounded.

HOWARD J. CLINEBELL

Changing the Attitude of Christian toward Jew. By HENRY ENOCH KAGAN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1952. xvi, 155 pp. $2.75.

The general problem Dr. Kagan sets for himself is one of evaluating differing techniques of improving group relations. His method is experimental. He employed three different techniques on 525 Christian young people at a series of seminars in Connecticut and West Virginia at which he, as a Rabbi, had been asked to teach. The "Indirect Group Method" involved the imparting of information on Judaism; the "Direct Group Method" provided in addition for direct expression and evaluation of the groups' hostility toward Jews; and the "Focused Private Interview" took students who had been subjected to the indirect method and provided thirty minute private interviews with the Rabbi. The primary source of data was a scale for measuring attitudes toward Jews which was administered to each group before and after the course of studies. Eight months after the courses were over, "stability tests" were administered.

Kagan is a most careful investigator. His statistical and experimental techniques are all explained in the book. Here are the conclusions (space precludes documentation): the imparting of information alone does not at all reduce prejudice (This shows the worthlessness of many current interfaith programs). The direct group approach does significantly alter the attitude of Christians toward Jews. The private interview method proved to be more effective and stable than the indirect approach but less effective than the direct approach. Unfortunately, "there is no association between the degree of prejudice of a Christian . . . and his verbal behavior in witnessing anti-Jewish situations." Least prejudiced Christians show only a slightly greater tendency than do other Christians to defend Jews.

For all his statistical and experimental care, the author is oblivious to an important *control factor.* The interpretation he presented to the Christian students was Reform Judaism. Kagan is rightly aware of the religious factor in anti-Semitism, but his own theology prohibits him from allowing for the possibility that anti-Semitism is a Christian means of sinfully rebelling against God and his chosen people. Instead, discussions with the boys and girls centered around religio-moral values, democracy, and "personal stability." The students were told that the Old Testament is an example of "religious idealism"! The author's "scientific" approach is thus not broadly enough conceived.

A. ROY ECKARDT

What Is the Best New Testament? By Ernest Cadman Colwell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952. viii, 246 pp. $4.50.

Dr. Colwell combines scholarly knowledge of the history of the New Testament textual criticism, a capacity for imaginative and creative insight in that field, and the ability to make the results of research intelligible and interesting to the inexpert reader. This book is an admirable example of this synthesis. It is obviously addressed to the "ordinary reader," and such a one is not likely to lay the book down once he has started it; but it manages to deal with the most important problems of textual criticism and contains some information not available elsewhere, as well as many original and brilliant suggestions.

John Knox

Man and His Gods. By Homer W. Smith. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. x, 501 pp. $5.00.

In his Foreword to this excursion into the field of religion by a professor of physiology, Albert Einstein writes: "This is a biologist speaking, whose scientific training has disciplined him in a grim objectivity rarely found in the pure historian. This objectivity has not, however, hindered him from emphasizing the boundless suffering which, in its end results, this mythic thought has brought upon man." It is a pity that this "grim objectivity" does not enable him to perceive any of the positive aspects of religion, such as great literature, mighty architecture, beautiful works of art, universities, hospitals, etc., of which it has been the inspiration—not to mention the concepts of justice and righteousness and the brotherhood of man.

The Sandpaintings of the Kayenta Navaho. By Leland C. Wyman. Albuquerque, New Mexico: The University of New Mexico Press, 1952. 120 pp. 49 illustrations. $1.75.

This monograph presents an analysis of the collection of sandpaintings made by the late Louisa Wade Wetherill, one of the very few consisting of reproductions made by the Indians themselves. This would seem, on the face of it, to be a distinct advantage, making for greater accuracy, but such is not necessarily the case, since the sketches were made "reluctantly, in secrecy, and in fear of reprisals," and it may well be that the recorder "introduced many of the variations deliberately so that his sketches would not be actual sacred pictures, thus hoping to escape punishment, both from the supernaturals and from his fellowmen, if he were found out, . . ." Among the atypical features mentioned are unorthodox colors, semi-naturalistic plant forms, occasional extraordinary symbols and compositions, unusual guardians in complete borders without an eastern opening, and unusual color sequences. These variations from the norm may be attributed to "Sam Chief's apparent delight in experimentation."

Der Rig-Veda. Translated into German by KARL FRIEDRICH GELDNER. 3 vols. (Harvard Oriental Series, Vols. 33-35.) Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951. xix, 490 pp.; 435 pp.; 418 pp. $20.00.

This new edition of the famous Geldner translation and commentary makes available once more to scholars an invaluable reference work, the first part of which (Books 1 to 4) appeared in October, 1923. The preparation of this revised edition for the Harvard Oriental Series was undertaken by Professor Charles R. Lanman, editor of the series, and completed by Professor W. E. Clark after Professor Lanman's health had broken down. This magnificent piece of work is fittingly dedicated to Professor Lanman, and ends, also most fittingly, with a memorial to Henry Clarke Warren, whose generosity made the Harvard Oriental Series possible. The publication of these volumes puts the world of scholarship deeply in debt to a great University and its great scholars.

Das Auge der Einfalt. By CONNY EDLUND. Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1952. 143 pp. Kr. 10.

This work, subtitled, "Eine Untersuching zu Matth. 6,22-23 und Luk. 11,34-35," is a product of the famous New Testament Seminar of Uppsala University. The twelve page bibliography bears mute testimony to the extensive research underlying this small book, and to the thoroughness characteristic of the work of this Seminar.

L'Edda: Carmi Norreni. Translated and edited by C. A. MASTRELLI. Florence: Sansoni, n.d. civ, 600 pp. 40 plates. L. 4000.

This Italian translation of the *Edda* is the first of a series entitled *Classici della religione* to be published under the direction of the veteran scholar in the field of comparative religion, Raffaele Pettazzoni. In his Preface, Professor Pettazzoni discusses the *Edda* as a "sacred book," not in the sense of canonical scripture, but "in another sense: sacred for its divine and heroic subject matter, like that of the Iliad; sacred for its religious spirit, more profound than that of the Iliad; sacred and revered as testimony to the origin and common patrimony of the German race. . . ." But the world of the Edda is not purely Germanic; like the Iliad, it is "the fruit of a world of expatriates," separated from the main centers of Indo-Germanic culture.

The interest of the book is greatly enhanced by its well selected plates illustrating the advanced culture of the Viking Age.

Rechtfertigung und Heiligung in der frühen evangelischen Theologie Luthers. By AXEL GYLLENKROK. (*Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift* 1952:2.) Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln, 1952. x, 148 pp. Kr. 8.

The author's aim has been to analyze the fundamental theme of "Law and Gospel" as it appears in Luther's earlier theological thought, and in the light

of recent Luther research. In his Foreword he says, " 'A Coming to Terms with the New Luther Research" would have been a not unsuitable sub-title for the work submitted here." It, therefore, contains a considerable amount of criticism of the work of certain scholars, e.g., Prenter, Hermann, Seeberg, and others.

Philosophy and the Experimental Sciences. Ed. by CHARLES A. HART. (Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXVI.) Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1952. 232 pp. $3.00.

For this work "philosophy" means Thomism, of course. It is, therefore, an attempt on the part of Catholic philosophers to come to grips in terms of Thomistic philosophy with modern scientific concepts, especially in the field of physics, biology, and psychology. Etienne Gilson gives the "keynote address" in his acceptance of the second award of the Cardinal Spellman-Aquinas Medal. According to Gilson, the relation between science and philosophy seems to be a sort of armistice. He says, "So long as they themselves don't ask religious questions, scientists will never be offered religious answers."

Seder Avodah. Compiled, Edited and Translated by RABBI MAX D. KLEIN. New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1951. xvi, 649 pp. $2.50.

The sub-title describes this book as a "Prayer Book for Sabbath, Festivals and Weekdays . . . for Use in Synagogue and Home," and, in his preface, Rabbi Klein says that it is intended to replace the *Abodath Israel,* arranged by Rabbis Marcus Jastrow and Benjamin Szold more than seventy years ago. The new Prayer Book aims to "better serve present-day needs," by representing "a less traditional point of view than that which obtains generally in the printed ritual of the Conservative camp in American Israel."

The Chicago Pinkas. Edited by SIMON RAWIDOWICZ. Chicago: The College of Jewish Studies, 1952. 197, (120) pp. $5.00.

This book is the first volume of a series of studies on the history of the Jewish community of Chicago (the second largest Jewish community in the world). Research into the beginnings of Chicago Jewry is badly handicapped by the destruction of documents in the fire of 1871, but, nevertheless, a great deal of valuable material has been unearthed. Especially interesting is the chapter on "Aspects of Chicago Russian-Jewish Life, 1893-1915," by S. J. Pomrenze. The book contains copious bibliographies and statistical tables. The second section is in Hebrew.

Christ's Hope of the Kingdom. By ALEXANDER MCLEISH. London: World Dominion Press, 1952. x, 165 pp. 6*s*.

The author of this book is one of the most active and influential members of the World Dominion Movement, and, as its "Survey Editor," has been responsible for its valuable survey series of missionary reports. In Section I, he discusses "The Hope of the Kingdom in the New Testament" in the light of Christ's command to carry the gospel to all nations, and, in Section II, he surveys the missionary activities of the churches in our contemporary world. The emphasis here is on the importance of the indigenous churches in the great task of "preparing the way of the Lord," in the firm belief that the Kingdom will come *within* (and not beyond) history.

Mary in the Documents of the Church. By PAUL F. PALMER, S. J. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1952. xxii, 129 pp. $2.25.

This little work of Roman Catholic apologetics has come into existence as a direct result of the promulgation of the dogma of the Assumption and the theological controversies it has aroused. The scope of the work is best indicated by the titles of its nine parts: The Faith of the Early Church, The Earliest Encomiums to Mary, The Tradition of the West, Devotion to Mary in the East, Controversy in the West, From the Council of Trent to Pius IX, The Dogma of the Immaculate Conception, Mary, Mediatrix and Co-Redemptrix, and The Dogma of the Assumption. Here we have an invaluable collection of source material for the study of the development of the cult of the Blessed Virgin, the most striking aspect of contemporary Catholicism—and to Protestants the most incomprehensible. The amazing richness of poetic symbolism of this cult is illustrated in the list of the Titles of Mary (pp. 115-21), of which the following are a few examples: "Bride unbrided," "Dove of simplicity," "Lamp unquenchable."

The Worship of the Church. By MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR. Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1952. ix, 240 pp. Cloth, $2.50. Paper, $1.50.

Professor Massey, of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Mass., writes here of a subject in which he is an acknowledged authority. In Part I he discusses "The Principles of Christian Worship" in relation to the motives and elements of corporate worship and its liturgical aspects. The section on the historical development of the liturgy (pp. 67-94) presents an amazing amount of information in a brief and clear statement. Part II, "The Book of Common Prayer," begins with an analysis of the Christian Year, and proceeds to describe the various offices in relation to their historical and doctrinal background. The bibliography is particularly useful to the student of liturgy.

Max Leopold Margolis—Scholar and Teacher. Ed. by ROBERT GORDIS. Philadelphia: The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1952. xii, 124 pp. $2.50.

This memorial volume was published by the Alumni Association of Dropsie College as a tribute to Professor Margolis twenty years after his death. It contains studies of his contributions to the fields of Bible and Rabbinics (by Frank Zimmermann), Semitic linguistics (by Ephraim Speiser), the Septuagint (by Harry M. Orlinsky), and the history and philosophy of Judaism (by Joshua Bloch), as well as a biographical sketch by Robert Gordis, and a bibliography compiled by Joseph Reider—all of these eminent scholars being former pupils of Professor Margolis.

The Bible and the Common Reader. By MARY ELLEN CHASE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. xi, 325 pp. $4.00.

Readings from the Bible. Selected and edited by MARY ELLEN CHASE. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952. ix, 422 pp. $3.75.

The first of these two books by a well-known novelist and Professor of English Literature at Smith College was published first in 1944 and has enjoyed a well-deserved popularity as an introduction to the Bible for the general reader. The present revised and enlarged edition contains, besides entirely new chapters, several useful maps and a chronological chart.

The second book is a collection of passages from the Bible, with explanatory notes, selected to include only those used by Professor Chase with her students at Smith, the basis of selection being her conviction "that it is far better to know well the best of the Bible than to have a smattering of all of it." She makes no apology for using the King James Version, since "no other version, early or late, contains the dignity and the beauty of our incomparable translation of 1611."

Poetry, Religion and the Spiritual Life. By GEORGE F. THOMAS. Houston, Texas: The Elsevier Press, 1951. ix, 113 pp. $2.00.

These three Rockwell Lectures, delivered at the Rice Institute, Houston, by Professor Thomas, of Princeton, are "an attempt to round out" the author's philosophy of spirit, expounded in his book, *Spirit and Its Freedom.* Lecture I, "The Spiritual Life Today," pleads for a return to Christian Humanism. Lecture II, "Imagination and Poetry," is a vigorous defense of the imagination and the contribution of poetry to religion. Lecture III, "Religion," deals with the nature and function of symbols, and expounds the author's idea of "mature" religion.

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